National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) set US policy on strengthening protections for federally funded research and development. It directs federal funding agencies to standardise and clarify disclosure requirements for participants in research, and it asks certain research institutions to establish research-security programmes. This article is a neutral explainer of what NSPM-33 covers; it is not legal or compliance advice, and the binding detail lives in each agency’s implementing rules.
What NSPM-33 is trying to do
NSPM-33 responds to concerns about the integrity of the research enterprise — chiefly around undisclosed conflicts of interest and commitment, and the risk of inappropriate transfer of federally funded research results. Its core principle is that openness and security can coexist: it reaffirms that fundamental research should remain open while asking the system to be more transparent about affiliations, support and commitments so that risks can be identified and managed.
Importantly, the memorandum directs agencies to act consistently. A recurring frustration before NSPM-33 was that different agencies asked for disclosures in different formats and used different definitions. A central aim is to harmonise those expectations across the federal government.
Standardised disclosure requirements
The disclosure element asks that researchers consistently report information relevant to identifying conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment. In broad terms this includes current and pending research support, professional appointments and positions, and other affiliations and resources that could bear on the integrity of the research.
- Current and pending support: all sources of research funding, foreign and domestic.
- Appointments and positions: including foreign appointments and titles.
- Other support and in-kind resources: resources that benefit the research effort.
- Consistency: common forms and definitions so disclosures are comparable across agencies.
The emphasis is on completeness and accuracy rather than on prohibiting international collaboration. Disclosure makes relationships visible so that genuine conflicts can be evaluated and managed.
Research-security programmes: the four elements
NSPM-33 also contemplates that covered institutions receiving federal science funding above a defined level maintain a research-security programme. As described in implementation guidance, such programmes are generally built around four elements:
- Cybersecurity: protecting research data and systems.
- Foreign-travel security: tracking and supporting security for international research travel.
- Research-security training: educating researchers on risks and obligations.
- Export-control training: ensuring awareness of export-control responsibilities.
The export-control element connects research security to a separate, long-standing legal regime. For background on how export controls treat openly published research, see our explainer on the fundamental-research exclusion, which is central to understanding what NSPM-33 does and does not restrict.
Openness and security as complementary goals
A theme worth drawing out is that NSPM-33 frames openness and security not as opposites but as goals to be balanced. The US research enterprise has long derived strength from international collaboration and the open exchange of ideas, and the memorandum is explicit that it does not seek to undermine that openness or to discourage legitimate international partnership. Instead, it aims to make the system more resilient to a narrow set of risks — undisclosed conflicts and inappropriate transfer of results — while leaving the open, collaborative character of fundamental research intact. The emphasis on transparency rather than prohibition is the practical expression of that balance.
The fundamental-research principle
A key point of reassurance in NSPM-33 is that it does not seek to close off basic and applied research that is ordinarily published and shared. Long-standing US policy treats such fundamental research as outside many export-control restrictions precisely because it is openly disseminated. NSPM-33 operates alongside that principle: it improves transparency about who is involved and how they are supported, rather than reclassifying open research as controlled.
This is why disclosure, not restriction, is the dominant tool. The aim is informed risk management — knowing the affiliations and support behind a project — rather than blanket limits on collaboration. Our broader research-compliance overview situates these expectations within the wider grants framework.
Conflicts of interest versus conflicts of commitment
NSPM-33’s disclosure emphasis turns on two related but distinct concepts that are worth separating. A conflict of interest arises when an external financial or personal interest could bias the design, conduct or reporting of research. A conflict of commitment arises when outside obligations — such as an undisclosed appointment at another institution — compete with the time and intellectual commitments a researcher owes to their primary employer and to a funded project.
Much of the concern that motivated NSPM-33 involved undisclosed conflicts of commitment, where affiliations or support were not reported. The disclosure framework is designed to surface both kinds of conflict so they can be evaluated. Disclosure does not by itself imply wrongdoing; it is the mechanism that allows institutions and agencies to distinguish benign, well-managed relationships from genuine problems.
What institutions did in practice
In response, many research institutions reviewed and updated their conflict-of-interest and conflict-of-commitment policies, refreshed disclosure processes, and built or formalised research-security functions covering the four programme elements. Some appointed designated research-security officials or points of contact, expanded training, and integrated disclosure checks into proposal and award workflows. Because the requirements are implemented through individual agency rules and award terms, the specific obligations an institution faces depend on which agencies fund it and at what level, and institutions track the rules of each relevant funder rather than assuming a single uniform standard.
The headline is a balance: NSPM-33 pairs clearer, standardised disclosure with structured research-security programmes, while preserving the openness of fundamental research. For authoritative detail, institutions consult the implementing guidance from the relevant federal agencies and OSTP at whitehouse.gov/ostp. For related terminology, see our standards dictionary.