Examples
Examples from published documents
- Anthropic's novel chemical and biological weapons threshold covers AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is currently the primary barrier to developing such weapons (Anthropic RSP v3.4, section 1)
- OpenAI's High threshold for AI Self-improvement is a model whose impact equals giving every OpenAI researcher a highly performant mid-career research engineer assistant, relative to a 2024 baseline (OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, Table 1)
- Magic set its threshold at models exceeding 50% accuracy on LiveCodeBench at the end of a training run (Magic AGI Readiness Policy, Threshold Definition)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A risk threshold or overall risk level (for example Meta's "High" or "Critical" risk thresholds) measures the risk a deployment poses, often after safeguards; a capability threshold measures what the model can do before safeguards.
- A compute threshold, such as a training-compute figure that decides whether a law applies to a model at all, is a coverage test (see coverage-scope-threshold), not a capability threshold.
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- AI Safety Level (ASL)
- AI Safety Level (ASL) is Anthropic's label for graded sets of safety and security safeguards, such as ASL-3. Earlier versions of its Responsible Scaling Policy also used ASLs to classify models; version 3.4 uses ASLs only for present safeguard levels.
- Source: Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4
- Critical Capability Level (CCL)
- A Critical Capability Level (CCL) is Google DeepMind's term for a capability threshold: a capability level at which, absent mitigation measures, a frontier AI model may pose heightened risk of severe harm.
- Source: Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1
- Tracked Capability Level (TCL)
- A Tracked Capability Level (TCL) is Google DeepMind's term for a capability threshold below a Critical Capability Level, marking where a model may pose significant but not severe harm. Mitigation and risk acceptance apply proportionately at a TCL.
- Source: Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1
- High capability
- High capability is the lower of the two capability thresholds in OpenAI's Preparedness Framework: capabilities that significantly increase existing risk vectors for severe harm. Models that cross it need safeguards that sufficiently minimise the risk before deployment.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
- Critical capability
- Critical capability is the upper capability threshold in OpenAI's Preparedness Framework: capabilities that present a meaningful risk of a qualitatively new threat vector for severe harm with no ready precedent. It requires safeguards even during development.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
- Tracked Category
- A Tracked Category is a capability area that OpenAI's Preparedness Framework measures for every covered deployment and prepares safeguards for. The current ones are Biological and Chemical, Cybersecurity, and AI Self-improvement; less mature areas are Research Categories.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
- Intolerable risk
- Intolerable risk is the level of severe risk an organisation will not accept unless it is adequately mitigated. Signatories of the 2024 Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments agreed to set thresholds marking intolerable risk and to monitor how close models come to them.
- Source: Frontier AI Safety Commitments (AI Seoul Summit 2024)
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §1.3.1, §1.3.2, §3.2
“"AI R&D threshold (current)": met if "(1) our models would be able to fully substitute for our entire set of Research Scientists and Research Engineers, at competitive costs (i.e., within a factor of 5); or (2) there is 'dramatic acceleration' of the pace of AI progress for reasons that likely relate to the automation of AI R&D" (§1.3.1, §3.2).”
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdfGoogle DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1, glossary, p.18
“"Critical Capability Levels (CCLs): are the main capability thresholds around which we have built the Framework process." "Tracked Capability Levels (TCLs): are capability thresholds which capture a lower level of risks than our CCLs." (glossary, p.18)”
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/DeepMind.com/Blog/strengthening-our-frontier-safety-framework/frontier-safety-framework_3-1.pdfMagic AGI Readiness Policy, Threshold Definition
“"when, at the end of a training run, our models exceed a threshold of 50% accuracy on LiveCodeBench, we will trigger our commitment to incorporate a full system of dangerous capabilities evaluations and planned mitigations into our AGI Readiness Policy"; public-model baseline given for comparison: "Claude-3.5-Sonnet 48.8%".”
https://magic.dev/agi-readiness-policy
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 / RSP v3.4 | “"AI R&D threshold (current)": met if "(1) our models would be able to fully substitute for our entire set of Research Scientists and Research Engineers, at competitive costs (i.e., within a factor of 5); or (2) there is 'dramatic acceleration' of the pace of AI progress for reasons that likely relate to the automation of AI R&D" (§1.3.1, §3.2). CB-2 threshold: "AI systems that can functionally substitute for the scarce human expertise that is currently the primary barrier to novel development of chemical and biological weapons with potential for catastrophic harm ..." (§1.3.2). RSP §1 table header: "Capability or usage threshold."” The threshold wording appears in both RSP v3.4 (section 1 table, whose first column is headed "Capability or usage threshold") and the Risk Report, which applies it. | exactEQ confidence: high | Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 |
| OpenAIShadow mapping Preparedness Framework v2 / Frontier Governance Framework | “"Capability thresholds: concretely describe things an AI system might be able to help someone do or might be able to do on its own that could meaningfully increase risk of severe harm." (§2.2). FGF: the term capability threshold is used but not formally defined; "Risk tiers" are the published scale (§2.2, §2.3).” | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 | “"Critical Capability Levels (CCLs): are the main capability thresholds around which we have built the Framework process." "Tracked Capability Levels (TCLs): are capability thresholds which capture a lower level of risks than our CCLs." (glossary, p.18)” | exactEQ confidence: high | Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 |
| xAIShadow mapping xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026) / Grok 4.6 card / earlier xAI frameworks | “June 2026 framework: "When analyzing whether a threshold has been reached ..." (s.2.3), with no thresholds stated. Grok 4.6 card: "FAIF safety thresholds" cited with no values given. The earlier Dec 2025 FAIF and Aug 2025 RMF used deployment acceptance criteria instead: "maintaining an answer rate of less than 1 out of 20 on restricted queries" and "a dishonesty rate of less than 1 out of 2 on MASK."” PDF metadata /Title of the 30 Jun 2026 framework reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final was found. | noneDU confidence: medium | xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026, draft-marked) |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter | “Measure 4.1: for each identified systemic risk, Signatories "define appropriate systemic risk tiers that: (i) are defined in terms of model capabilities, and may additionally incorporate model propensities, risk estimates, and/or other suitable metrics; (ii) are measurable; and (iii) comprise at least one systemic risk tier that has not been reached by the model." Content of tiers left to each Signatory; no shared tier scale published in the chapter.” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter |
| California SB 53Shadow mapping California SB 53 | “Frameworks must describe "(2) Defining and assessing thresholds used by the large frontier developer to identify and assess whether a frontier model has capabilities that could pose a catastrophic risk, which may include multiple-tiered thresholds." (22757.12(a)). "Threshold" itself is not defined by the statute.” | noneDU confidence: medium | California SB 53 |
| US Government (Executive Order 14409)Shadow mapping EO 14409 / Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments | “EO 14409 designation threshold is classified (cyber domain). Seoul Commitment II: thresholds are "at which severe risks posed by a model or system, unless adequately mitigated, would be deemed intolerable" — a narrower, outcome-gated framing than a capability threshold proper.” | narrowNR confidence: medium | Executive Order 14409 |
| METRShadow mapping METR Common Elements | “"Capability Thresholds": "Thresholds at which specific AI capabilities would pose severe risk and require new mitigations."” | exactEQ confidence: high | METR (common-elements) |
| Frontier Model ForumShadow mapping FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds | “"Enabling Capability Thresholds (also called 'critical capability levels' or 'capability thresholds'): Abilities that could potentially enable extreme harms if the model is deployed without additional safeguards." (s3.1, p.10)” | exactEQ confidence: high | FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds |
| AmazonShadow mapping Amazon Frontier Model Safety Framework | “"Critical Capability Thresholds": "a set of model capabilities that have the potential to cause significant harm to the public if misused" (Overview, p.1); one qualitative threshold per domain (CBRN, Offensive Cyber Operations, Automated AI R&D), stated as an uplift-based description rather than a benchmark score.” | exactEQ confidence: high | Amazon Frontier Model Safety Framework |
| MagicShadow mapping Magic AGI Readiness Policy | “"when, at the end of a training run, our models exceed a threshold of 50% accuracy on LiveCodeBench, we will trigger our commitment to incorporate a full system of dangerous capabilities evaluations and planned mitigations into our AGI Readiness Policy" (Threshold Definition), with the contemporaneous public-model baseline "Claude-3.5-Sonnet 48.8%" given for comparison.” The page carries the banner "Note: This policy is outdated. We're working on an update." | exactEQ confidence: high | Magic AGI Readiness Policy |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- Meta
"Risk thresholds: are the incremental levels of risk that a Frontier AI model might pose towards realization of a catastrophic outcome" (Appendix I) — these are outcome-based risk levels, not capability thresholds; capability enters only through separately-named "Enabling capabilities" and "Operational threshold" (cyber).
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
Gap
SB 53 requires thresholds but defines none; xAI's current framework and the Grok 4.6 card cite thresholds that are not published; Amazon's thresholds are qualitative only, with undefined terms such as "material uplift" and "reliably." Numeric public values are rare: Magic discloses a benchmark threshold (50% on LiveCodeBench), Meta discloses evaluation cut-offs such as "< 75% pass@10" on simple capture-the-flag challenges, and Google DeepMind's Gemini 3.7 Flash report discloses a 90% safety margin for its ML R&D automation level. NIKOLAI proposes a `threshold.disclosureStatus` value set (quantified; qualitative; referenced-but-undefined; classified).







