Examples
Examples from published documents
- OpenAI tests with the highest-capability tier of system settings, a model variant with a negligible rate of safety-based refusals and the best available scaffolds, and treats any one-time capability elicitation as a lower bound rather than a ceiling (OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, section 3.1)
- Anthropic reports that fine-tuning and prompt optimisation raised Mythos 5's SHADE-Arena score from 0% to 3.8% and 9.2% respectively, while stating that it has not provided clear evidence that this elicitation is sufficiently strong (Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, sections 2.7 and 2.16.1)
- Meta gives agents a task-optimised scaffold and a generous token budget, up to the maximum context length or the point at which performance plateaus, and reviews transcripts for easily fixable agent failures (Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2, section 4.2)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- Removing production safeguards, as in xAI's "unrestricted configuration", is one input to elicitation rather than the whole method: on its own it adds no fine-tuning, scaffolding or extra compute.
- Scores published at default settings show typical behaviour, not an elicited maximum; they cannot be used to rule out a dangerous capability.
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Capability elicitation
- Capability elicitation is the deliberate effort to make an AI model show its full abilities during testing, using techniques such as fine-tuning, prompt optimisation, multi-agent setups and tool access, so that dangerous capabilities are not underestimated.
- Source: Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework
- Under-elicitation
- Under-elicitation is a failure to draw out a model's real capability during an evaluation, for example through weak prompting, missing tools or unhandled refusals, which makes the model look less capable than it is.
- Source: EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
- Helpful-only model
- A helpful-only model is a variant of a production AI model trained not to refuse potentially harmful requests, used so that dangerous-capability evaluations and red-teaming measure what the model can do rather than what it declines to do.
- Source: Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026)
- Fine-tuning for elicitation
- Fine-tuning for elicitation is extra training of a model on task-relevant data before testing, to estimate the upper bound of what someone with the weights or a fine-tuning API could make it do.
- Source: Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
- Scaffolding
- Scaffolding, also called an agent harness, is the software around a model in an agentic evaluation, such as tools, memory and multi-step or multi-agent loops, that lets it act on tasks; weak scaffolding can understate capability.
- Source: Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
- Lower bound (elicitation)
- A lower bound, in elicitation, is the reading of a one-time capability test as the least a model can do, not the most, because better scaffolds and techniques found later may draw out more.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, §3.1
“we regard any one-time capability elicitation in a frontier model as a lower bound, rather than a ceiling, on capabilities that may emerge in real world use and misuse.”
https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/18a02b5d-6b67-4cec-ab64-68cdfbddebcd/preparedness-framework-v2.pdfEU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Appendix 3.2, 3.4
“at least a state-of-the-art level of model elicitation that elicits the model's capabilities, propensities, affordances, and/or effects ... (1) minimise the risk of under-elicitation; and (2) minimise the risk of model deception during model evaluations (e.g. sandbagging).”
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report, Elicitation, p.5
“We use a number of elicitation methods to surface a model's latent capabilities and propensities, and ensure that our risk assessment is based on the model's absolute potential rather than its default behavior.”
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini_3-7_flash_fsf_report.pdf
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) | “Elicitation experiments "using fine-tuning and prompt optimization, which increase Mythos 5's SHADE-Arena performance from 0% to 3.8% and 9.2% respectively" (§2.7); "we have not provided clear evidence that this elicitation is sufficiently strong" (§2.16.1).” | closeCL confidence: high | Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) |
| OpenAIShadow mapping OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 | “Elicitation aims at "the high end of expected elicitation by threat actors" using highest-capability settings, a variant with a "negligible rate of safety-based refusals", best scaffolds, and fine-tuning if weights will be released; "we regard any one-time capability elicitation in a frontier model as a lower bound, rather than a ceiling" (§3.1).” | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 |
| OpenAIShadow mapping GPT-5.6 deployment safety card | “SecureBio evaluated "a railfree version of GPT-5.6 Sol" with filters disabled (s.9.1.1.8).” | exactEQ confidence: high | GPT-5.6 deployment safety card |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report | “"We use a number of elicitation methods to surface a model's latent capabilities and propensities, and ensure that our risk assessment is based on the model's absolute potential rather than its default behavior"; agentic domains get "state-of-the-art scaffolding and affordances", and "we actively take steps to minimize the risk of under-elicitation" (Elicitation, p.5).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 | “evaluations use "appropriate scaffolding, inference compute, and other augmentations" (s.1.3.2).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 |
| xAIShadow mapping Grok 4.6 model card | “"Unrestricted configuration": capability testing "without the safeguards we use in production, which would otherwise mask the model's full capability" (§7, §7.1) — safeguard removal only, narrower than the general elicitation-method concept.” | narrowNR confidence: medium | Grok 4.6 model card |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “Helpful-only fine-tuning "(i.e., refusal-free)", domain-specific capability training for open release, task-optimised scaffolds; "Agents will be provided with a generous token budget, up to the maximum context length or to the point at which performance plateaus" (§4.2).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| METRShadow mapping METR | “"Full Capability Elicitation During Evaluations: Intentions to perform model evaluations in a way that does not underestimate the full capabilities of the model."” | exactEQ confidence: high | METR |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Appendix 3.2 "Model elicitation": evaluations must use "at least a state-of-the-art level of model elicitation that elicits the model's capabilities, propensities, affordances, and/or effects", techniques that "(1) minimise the risk of under-elicitation; and (2) minimise the risk of model deception during model evaluations (e.g. sandbagging)"; Appendix 3.4 requires access to "the model version(s) with the fewest safety mitigations implemented (such as a helpful-only model version, if it exists)" and an indicative time floor of "at least 20 business days ... for most systemic risks and model evaluation methods."” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| MicrosoftShadow mapping Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework | “"Capability elicitation: Evaluations include concerted efforts at capability elicitation, i.e., applying capability enhancing techniques to advance understanding of a model's full capabilities"; "Resources applied to elicitation should be extrapolated out to those available to actors in threat models relevant to each tracked high-risk capability" (Deeper capability assessment, p.6).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework |
| G42Shadow mapping G42 Frontier Safety Framework | “In-depth evaluations "will incorporate capability elicitation", "techniques such as prompt engineering, fine-tuning, and agentic tool usage", to "optimize performance, overcome model refusals, and avoid underestimating model capabilities" (Frontier Capability Threshold evaluations, PDF p.4).” | exactEQ confidence: high | G42 Frontier Safety Framework |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- UK Government / AISI
UK AISI "Grey box access": "access to chain-of-thought of the safety reasoning monitor, exact policy wording, and real-time feedback on classifier labels that would not be accessible to real-world attackers" — an access-tier pointer, not itself an elicitation-method definition.
GPT-5.6 deployment safety card - Frontier Model Forum
Access item "version with limited safety training" — a pointer, not a full elicitation-method definition.
Frontier Model Forum, Third-Party Assessments







