Examples
Examples from published documents
- OpenAI reports that UK AISI received 'extensive grey box access': the chain-of-thought of the safety reasoning monitor, exact policy wording and real-time classifier-label feedback (OpenAI GPT-5.6 System Card, s.9.4.6).
- Participants in METR's cross-developer risk report provided their most capable internal models, including raw chains of thought, and non-public information on internal AI use (METR Frontier Risk Report, Feb-Mar 2026).
- The Model Report must describe 'the access and other resources provided to' internal evaluation teams and independent external evaluators (EU GPAI Code of Practice, Measure 7.3(1)(g)).
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A developer's one-sided list of 'access given to evaluators' in its own report is a disclosure, not an attestation: nothing records whether the evaluator agrees the list is complete.
- The pre-release sharing window (how many days before release a tester gets the model) is one attribute of access, recorded separately.
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Embedded evaluator
- An embedded evaluator is a third-party evaluator given ongoing, employee-like access inside an AI developer, such as office desks, badges, laptops and internal tools, to verify safety practices and report incidents, rather than a time-limited engagement.
- Source: We Must Pace the Frontier (essay by Anthropic's CEO)
- Pre-deployment testing
- Pre-deployment testing is evaluation of an AI model by an outside party, such as a government AI institute, before public release, under an arrangement that gives the tester early access to the unreleased model.
- Source: OpenAI GPT-5.6 System Card
- Appropriate access
- Appropriate access is the level of model access, information and time an outside assessor needs for a given assessment, balanced against security, so that the developer shares only the minimum information necessary.
- Source: FMF Third-Party Assessments
- Security readiness
- Security readiness is an assessor's demonstrated ability to handle privileged access safely, through data-handling protocols, confidentiality agreements and access controls, before a developer grants it access to models or sensitive information.
- Source: FMF Third-Party Assessments
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Appendix 3.5
“Signatories will provide independent external evaluators with adequate access, information, time, and other resources (pursuant to Appendix 3.4), without prejudice to Appendix 4.4, point (1).”
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119METR Frontier Risk Report (February-March 2026), Executive summary
“Each participant provided: Access to their most capable internal model(s) at the time of assessment, including raw chains of thought. A wide range of non-public information about the capabilities of the shared model(s), how AI was used and monitored internally, and trends in the pace of progress.”
https://metr.org/blog/2026-05-19-frontier-risk-report/Executive Order 14409, Sec. 3(b)(ii)
“provide the Federal Government with access to covered frontier models, subject to appropriate confidentiality, cybersecurity, insider-risk, and intellectual-property protection, use, and nondisclosure requirements, for a period of up to 30 days.”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping We Must Pace the Frontier (essay by Anthropic's CEO) / Anthropic Alignment Assessment: Cybersecurity Incidents / Advanced AI Framework / Risk Report | “Essay: "Each frontier AI company commits to giving ongoing, employee-like access to a team of embedded third-party evaluators"; "Desks in our offices, access badges, and company laptops. Access to workspaces, tools, and permissions mostly comparable to what internal risk assessment teams have." METR agreement: "wide-ranging access, including to transcripts beyond the window in which the incidents occurred, and to Anthropic employees, who will be permitted to share confidential information. Our initial agreement runs for eight weeks". AAF: "access to an unredacted version of the developer's most recent risk report and system cards, access to the developer's most capable models, and the opportunity to ask and receive reasonable responses".” Also cites Anthropic Alignment Assessment: Cybersecurity Incidents, the Advanced AI Framework and the Risk Report. | closeCL confidence: medium | We Must Pace the Frontier (essay by Anthropic's CEO) |
| OpenAIShadow mapping Post on X by OpenAI's CEO / OpenAI GPT-5.6 System Card / METR incident investigation | “Post: "Committing to having independent evaluators with employee-like access is a great idea, and we will do the same." GPT-5.6 System Card: "UK AISI was provided with extensive grey box access: access to chain-of-thought of the safety reasoning monitor, exact policy wording, and real-time feedback on classifier labels that would not be accessible to real-world attackers" (s.9.4.6); SecureBio "evaluated two pre-release checkpoints of GPT-5.6 Sol and a railfree version of GPT-5.6 Sol" (s.9.1.1.8). METR investigation: "OpenAI attested that the transcripts we reviewed were unredacted."” Also cites the GPT-5.6 deployment safety card and METR's OpenAI/Hugging Face incident investigation. | closeCL confidence: medium | Post on X by OpenAI's CEO |
| xAIShadow mapping Grok 4.6 model card / Grok 4.20 model card / post on X by xAI's founder | “"We additionally provided an unrestricted configuration of Grok 4.6 to third-party evaluators, who corroborated the results of our internal evaluations and testing on cyber capabilities" (§7); Grok 4.20: early snapshot to third-party evaluators. Post: "Peer review of AI by competitors is the right way to start this off."” Also cites the Grok 4.20 model card and a post on X by xAI's founder. | narrowNR confidence: medium | Grok 4.6 model card |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “Preparedness reports describe "details about elicitation, time and resources spent, and access given to internal and external evaluators" (§2.2.1). A disclosure field, not an attestation.” | closeCL confidence: medium | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Appendix 3.5: "Signatories will provide independent external evaluators with adequate access, information, time, and other resources (pursuant to Appendix 3.4)". Appendix 3.4 defines that as "adequate access to the model ... including, as appropriate, access to model activations, gradients, logits (or other forms of raw model outputs), chains-of-thought, and/or other technical details, and access to the model version(s) with the fewest safety mitigations implemented (such as a helpful-only model version, if it exists)" and time: "For example, a period of at least 20 business days is appropriate for most systemic risks and model evaluation methods". Qualification requires domain expertise, information-security protocols and agreement to protect confidential information. Measure 7.3(1)(g): the Model Report gives "a description of the access and other resources provided to" internal teams and independent external evaluators. Measure 3.5 (post-market monitoring): "adequate free access" to the most capable deployed version, its chains-of-thought and the least-mitigated version, provided "through an API, on-premise access (including transport), access via Signatory-provided hardware, or by making the model parameters publicly available for download, as appropriate."” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| US Government (Executive Order 14409 / NIST CAISI)Shadow mapping Executive Order 14409 / NIST CAISI bulletin | “"provide the Federal Government with access to covered frontier models, subject to appropriate confidentiality, cybersecurity, insider-risk, and intellectual-property protection, use, and nondisclosure requirements, for a period of up to 30 days." The terms of agreements made by CAISSI (formerly CAISI) are not public (gap).” Also cites the NIST CAISI bulletin. | closeCL confidence: medium | Executive Order 14409 |
| METRShadow mapping METR Frontier Risk Report (Feb-Mar 2026) / METR incident-investigation post (28 Jul 2026) | “"Each participant provided: Access to their most capable internal model(s) at the time of assessment, including raw chains of thought." Requested: "Rate limits of at least 4M input tokens per minute, 1M output tokens per minute, and 1K requests per minute" and "Zero data retention (ZDR), if possible". 28 Jul 2026 post: "we believe that there should be full transparency about the terms of the engagement, including at least redaction terms, access provided, time and personnel provided, and agreed upon scope of the investigation."” Also cites METR's 28 Jul 2026 post (https://metr.org/blog/2026-07-28-investigating-ai-propensities-after-incidents/). | exactEQ confidence: high | METR Frontier Risk Report (February-March 2026) |
| Frontier Model ForumShadow mapping FMF Third-Party Assessments technical report | “"Appropriate access: balances information needs with security considerations ... providing only the minimum information necessary"; "Security readiness: ... third-party assessors must demonstrate their capacity to responsibly handle privileged access before receiving it." No numbered access levels.” | closeCL confidence: medium | FMF Third-Party Assessments |
| AI Evaluator Forum (AEF-1)Shadow mapping AEF-1: Minimum Operating Conditions for Independent Third Party AI Evaluations / arXiv 2601.11916 | “Proposed access levels "AL1 (black-box model access and minimal information), AL2 (grey-box model access and substantial information), and AL3 (white-box model access and comprehensive information)" (arXiv 2601.11916, abstract); AEF-1 principle "Sufficient Access and Resources": "1.1 Technical Access Requirement: The evaluator secured sufficient technical access to assess the specific system characteristics being evaluated."” Verified against the AEF-1 PDF and the arXiv 2601.11916 abstract (fetched 13 Nov 2026). The arXiv paper is an academic proposal, not a developer commitment; see the model-access-level element for the taxonomy. | closeCL confidence: medium | AEF-1: Minimum Operating Conditions for Independent Third Party AI Evaluations (v1, 4 Dec 2025) |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- Google DeepMind
UK AISI MoU: "Sharing access to our proprietary models, data and ideas to accelerate research progress." Access depth and timing unstated -- a pointer, not a mapping.
DeepMind / UK AI Security Institute partnership post
Gap
No developer, evaluator or regulator publishes access terms in a common record format. METR calls for 'full transparency about the terms of the engagement', the essay by Anthropic's CEO says reviewers should be able to publish 'the access they received or didn't receive', and AEF-1 supplies a disclosure checklist, but none defines fields that both parties confirm.







