Source of record
Where this definition comes from
Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4, §3.6.1, Selecting external reviewers
“significant expertise in evaluations for dangerous AI capabilities and propensities, including awareness of ways evaluations 'might be misleading (for example, alignment faking)'; ... a reviewing organization itself may not have a financial interest in Anthropic; and the individuals involved in conducting the review, as well as anyone above them in the reporting chain within their organization, may not have a financial interest in Anthropic or close personal relationships with anyone at Anthropic (i.e., family relationships, romantic relationships, or shared living arrangements).”
https://cdn.sanity.io/files/4zrzovbb/website/0bacdc8440ea96e62a8766d99ebe1d4eea6d5f3a.pdfMETR: OpenAI-Hugging Face incident investigation, conflict-of-interest footnotes
“METR does not accept compensation for this work. Ryan Greenblatt is the domestic partner of Beth Barnes, METR's CEO. Beth Barnes was not involved in the decision to engage Ryan Greenblatt, nor was she directly involved in this investigation.”
https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/FRONTIER Act, 119th Congress (H.R. 9925, introduced, not enacted), Sec. 4(c); Sec. 3(c)
“independent, with no financial interest either way" (Sec. 4(c)); IVOs must "show independence and meet funding-transparency and conflict-of-interest rules" as a licensing condition (Sec. 3(c)).”
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr9925ih/html/BILLS-119hr9925ih.htm
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4 / Advanced AI Framework / Amodei essay | “RSP v3.4 §3.6.1, three tests: significant expertise in "evaluations for dangerous AI capabilities and propensities", including awareness of ways evaluations "might be misleading (for example, alignment faking)"; incentives to be candid, e.g. "external review parties should not be teams whose revenue, reputation and success depend entirely on Anthropic and similar companies continuing to work with them"; and no conflicts of interest -- "a reviewing organization itself may not have a financial interest in Anthropic; and the individuals involved in conducting the review, as well as anyone above them in the reporting chain within their organization, may not have a financial interest in Anthropic or close personal relationships with anyone at Anthropic." Selection requires Board consultation and LTBT approval (§3.6.1). AAF: "independent in the sense of not having a financial interest in the developer and being free of major conflicts of interest with respect to the individuals involved in conducting the review" (p.7); "Evaluator shopping." Amodei: "a second opinion free of commercial incentives."” Also cites {AAF}, {PACE}. | exact confidence: high | Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4 |
| EU EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Appendix 3.5 "adequate qualification" test: "(1) having significant domain expertise for the systemic risk and being technically skilled and experienced in conducting model evaluations; (2) having appropriate internal and external information security protocols in place; and (3) having agreed to protect commercially confidential information, if they need access to such information." No explicit financial-conflict-of-interest test (unlike Anthropic's RSP §3.6.1); Model Report must give "an explanation of the choice of evaluator based on the qualification criteria" (Measure 7.4).” Notably lacks an explicit financial-COI test, unlike Anthropic's RSP. | close confidence: medium | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| METR METR (site) / METR OpenAI-Hugging Face incident investigation | “"METR does not accept compensation for this work." Per-person COI footnotes: "Ryan Greenblatt is the domestic partner of Beth Barnes, METR's CEO. Beth Barnes was not involved in the decision to engage Ryan Greenblatt, nor was she directly involved in this investigation." METR accepted "~$400K in free API credits."” Also cites {METRHF}. | exact confidence: high | METR |
| Frontier Model Forum FMF Third-Party Assessments technical report | “"Methodological independence: ... enables assessors to approach evaluations with a fresh perspective"; open-ended assessment may involve "internal assessors who are sufficiently independent"; brief gap: "No criteria for independence (financial, contractual, organisational)."” | close confidence: medium | FMF Third-Party Assessments |
| AI Evaluator Forum (AEF-1, discovery sweep) Discovery sweep | “AEF-1 condition "Minimized Conflicts of Interest" (discovery).” Unverified discovery-stage material. | close confidence: low | AI Evaluator Forum (AEF-1) discovery sweep |
| US Congress (H.R. 9925, FRONTIER Act, not enacted) FRONTIER Act, 119th Congress | “Compliance auditors must be "independent, with no financial interest either way" (Sec. 4(c)); IVOs must "show independence and meet funding-transparency and conflict-of-interest rules" as a licensing condition (Sec. 3(c)), and the licensing regulations must cover "conflict-of-interest and funding-transparency requirements, including reporting requirements regarding the IVOs' funding sources and revenue generation." A named "lead assessment partner" certifies "freedom from conflicts" on each report (Sec. 5).” Not enacted. | exact confidence: high | FRONTIER Act, 119th Congress (H.R. 9925, introduced, not enacted) |
| US Congress (S. 5061, 119th Congress, not enacted) S. 5061, 119th Congress | “The proposed AI Risk Board's conflict-of-interest policy: members have "a fiduciary responsibility to the Board, a duty to report conflicts of interest, including the appearance of a conflict of interest, and do not participate in deliberations or votes from which they personally or their employer would directly and materially benefit" (Sec. 3(b)(5)(D)(i)); members "who breach the COI policy are removed" (Sec. 3(b)(3)); lab-affiliated experts may sit on the Board "subject to COI disclosure and recusal"; members are sponsored for TS/SCI clearance, and "members denied a clearance, or restricted from classified information, are removed" (Sec. 3(b)(4)).” An institutional (board-member) COI regime rather than a reviewer-selection COI regime; described in the source document as a fuller independence regime than Anthropic's RSP §3.6.1 on institutional grounds. Not enacted. | close confidence: medium | S. 5061, 119th Congress |
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- OpenAI
Proposal that CAISI certify third-party assessors: "independent assessment certification" (blueprint p.5) -- RL, a pointer not a mapping; this is an OpenAI proposal, not current CAISI practice.
A Blueprint for a Federal Framework - Google DeepMind
HuBREC: "a research ethics committee run within Google DeepMind but staffed and chaired by academics from outside the company" (p.21) -- RL, a pointer not a mapping.
Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report - Meta
Evaluations "held out from teams conducting training to reduce the risk of overfitting" (§4.1) -- internal segregation, RL, a pointer not a mapping.
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 - US Government
"See OAI (CAISI certification is an OpenAI proposal, not current CAISI practice)" -- RL, a pointer not a mapping.
A Blueprint for a Federal Framework
