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NIKOLAI elementN2 · Threat models and risk framingProposednikolai-v0.3

Risk Pathway

Definition

A risk pathway is a specific causal route by which an AI model's capabilities or behaviour could lead to severe harm, broken into concrete steps. It is narrower than a threat model: one threat model can contain several pathways, each assessed and mitigated separately.

Also called: threat pathway, causal pathway, priority pathway

NIKOLAI's proposed operational definition

NIKOLAI editorial proposal (unsourced): a risk-pathway record is a specific causal route from model behaviour or misuse to harm, finer-grained than a threat model, capturing the concrete steps or stages by which a threat model's harm could actually occur, with its own assessment, mitigations and harm class (reversible or irreversible).

The operational definition is CASRAI's own proposal, not a definition any named organisation has agreed to. See what NIKOLAI is and is not, or browse the AI safety glossary.

Examples

Examples from published documents

  • Anthropic's misalignment assessment covers eight concrete pathways, among them "Code backdoors to help future misaligned models", "Self-exfiltration and autonomous operation" and "Persistent rogue internal deployment" (Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, section 2.2.1)
  • OpenAI's safeguards for Astra address two risk pathways: "(1) a malicious actor using Astra to develop novel exploits or carry out end to end attacks against hardened critical systems or (2) the model itself causing cyber harm when taking an unauthorized (or misaligned) action" (OpenAI, Path to Astra, section 10.2)
  • Meta requires that "It must be possible to identify a causal pathway for the catastrophic outcome, and to define one or more simulatable threat scenarios along that pathway" before an outcome enters its framework (Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2, section 3.2)

Counter-examples

Not to be confused with

  • A risk domain such as CBRN or cyber offence is not a risk pathway: it groups many pathways under one heading. xAI's framework calls its risk domains "principal pathways", a broader use of the same word.
  • A threat scenario is not the pathway itself: the scenario is one worked case (actor, target, steps), while the pathway is the causal route that such cases follow.

Related terms

Related AI safety terms

Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.

Self-exfiltration
Self-exfiltration is an AI model copying or moving its own weights out of its developer's secure storage. The EU Code of Practice covers transfer of weights "by the model itself and/or an unauthorised actor"; Anthropic lists self-exfiltration as a priority risk pathway.
Source: EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
Subterfuge
Subterfuge is the word Anthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4 uses for covert, deceptive conduct by an AI system. Its misalignment threshold covers systems with "moderate capacity for autonomous, goal-directed operation and subterfuge" that could carry out sabotage.
Source: Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4
Scheming
Scheming, which Google DeepMind's Gemini 3.7 Flash report says is "also known as deceptive alignment", is a model knowingly and covertly pursuing objectives misaligned with its developer's intention. OpenAI's Preparedness Framework lists deception and scheming as misaligned behaviours.
Source: Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
Stealth and situational awareness
Stealth and situational awareness are the two capabilities in Google DeepMind's misalignment threshold: situational awareness is the "ability to discover and use relevant details of its deployment setting", stealth the "ability to circumvent basic oversight mechanisms".
Source: Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1
Covert capabilities
Covert capabilities, in Anthropic's August 2026 Risk Report, are "the ability for a model to intentionally undermine the various oversight mechanisms we rely on to evaluate and mitigate model behavior", split into opaque reasoning, secret keeping, action obfuscation and selective action.
Source: Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026

Source of record

Where this definition comes from

Crosswalk

How named organisations use this concept

Every row below is a shadow mapping. A shadow row is CASRAI's own reading of a published document. No lab, evaluator or regulator named on a shadow row has declared, endorsed, or been consulted on it. That changes only when an organisation files its own Mapping Declaration.
OrganisationTheir term, as publishedMatch & verificationSource
AnthropicShadow mapping
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
“"Our risk assessment focuses on the following concrete pathways": "1. Broad/diffuse sandbagging on safety-relevant R&D, 2. Targeted undermining of safety-relevant R&D, 3. Code backdoors to help future misaligned models, 4. Poisoning the training data of future models, 5. Self-exfiltration and autonomous operation, 6. Persistent rogue internal deployment, 7. Undermining R&D within other high-resource AI developers, and 8. Undermining decisions within major governments" (§2.2.1). "We aren't able to defend the choice of these pathways rigorously" (§2.13).”exactEQ
confidence: high
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
OpenAIShadow mapping
Preparedness Framework v2 / Path to Astra
“Safeguards Report contents: "Identified ways a risk of severe harm can be realized for the given deployment, each mapped to the associated security controls and safeguards" (PF §4.2). Astra: "Risk pathways (cyber)": "(1) a malicious actor using Astra to develop novel exploits ... or (2) the model itself causing cyber harm when taking an unauthorized (or misaligned) action." (s.10.2)”closeCL
confidence: high
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
Google DeepMindShadow mapping
Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 / Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
“FSF v3.1: "CCLs are determined by identifying and analyzing the main foreseeable paths through which a model could result in severe harm" (s.1.2). The Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report restates this as "could cause severe harm" (report p.2).”closeCL
confidence: high
Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1
xAIShadow mapping
xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026)
“"These risk domains describe principal pathways through which severe or systemic harm may arise." (s.2.1). Here "pathway" names the risk domain itself, not a finer-grained causal route beneath it.”
PDF metadata /Title reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final was found.
noneFF
confidence: high
xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026, draft-marked)
MetaShadow mapping
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
“Threat modeling "identifies the potential causal pathways for realizing the catastrophic outcome" (Appendix I).”closeCL
confidence: high
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
California SB 53Shadow mapping
California SB 53
“Catastrophic risk arises from "a single incident involving a frontier model doing any of the following: (A) ... (B) ... (C) ..." (22757.11(c)) — a broader, outcome-defined construct than a specific causal pathway.”broadBR
confidence: medium
California SB 53
Frontier Model ForumShadow mapping
FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds
“Threat modeling includes "mapping the potential pathways to those outcomes"; "Credibility: There is a credible pathway to extreme harm." (s1.3, s2.1)”closeCL
confidence: high
FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds
EUShadow mapping
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
“"systemic risk modelling": "a structured process aimed at specifying pathways through which a systemic risk stemming from a model might materialise; often used interchangeably with the term 'threat modelling'" (Glossary; see Measure 3.3).”closeCL
confidence: high
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
What do these codes mean?
exact
The source term is equivalent to this element
close
The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
broad
The source term is broader than this element
narrow
The source term is narrower than this element
none
No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
EQ
Equivalent
CL
Close
BR
Source is broader than the element
NR
Source is narrower than the element
FF
False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
DU
Declared but undefined by the source
UV
Unverified

Related, not mapped

Pointers that are not crosswalk claims

These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.

  • Anthropic

    Pathway 6, "Persistent rogue internal deployment", is defined and assessed in the Risk Report (§2.11.3). The term rogue internal deployment is defined under the NIKOLAI element internal-deployment-risk (track N6); this element records it only as one pathway in Anthropic's list.

    Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026

Divergence

Where sources materially disagree

xAI's Frontier AI Framework uses "pathway" as a synonym for its risk domains themselves (s.2.1), not as a finer-grained causal route beneath a domain/threat-model as in Anthropic's eight priority risk pathways, OpenAI's Astra risk pathways, or Meta's causal pathways — a false-friend label collision. SB 53 uses the same word for its three incident mechanisms.

Referenced across the research world

University of Cambridge logoColumbia University logoCrossref logoUniversity of Edinburgh logoHarvard University logoUniversity of Oxford logoPrinceton University logoStanford School of Medicine logoUniversity College London logoORCID logoUniversity of Cambridge logoColumbia University logoCrossref logoUniversity of Edinburgh logoHarvard University logoUniversity of Oxford logoPrinceton University logoStanford School of Medicine logoUniversity College London logoORCID logo
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  • University College London logo
  • ORCID logo

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