Examples
Examples from published documents
- Google DeepMind: "Deployment Mitigations: are safety measures we implement which are intended to counter the misuse or misaligned expression of critical capabilities in deployments. They may include safety post-training, input/output/chain-of-thought monitoring and analysis, account moderation, jailbreak detection and patching, user verification, and bug bounties." (Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1, glossary)
- Anthropic's ASL-3 protections "include classifier guards at least as robust as our initial Constitutional Classifiers; access controls for trusted users with exemptions to classifier guards; red-teaming, bug bounties, and threat intelligence for continually assessing the threat of jailbreaks; and a number of noteworthy security controls." (Anthropic RSP v3.4, §1)
- OpenAI considers "separate safeguards for two of the main ways in which risks can be realized": a malicious user and "a misaligned model, which autonomously causes the harm" (OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, §4.1)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A capability threshold says when stronger safeguards become necessary; it is not itself a safeguard (see capability-threshold).
- A safety case is the argument that safeguards are adequate, not a safeguard (see safety-case).
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Mitigation
- A mitigation is any measure taken to reduce a risk. The EU GPAI Code of Practice splits AI mitigations into safety mitigations, which shape what a model does and who can use it, and security mitigations, which protect the model and its infrastructure.
- Source: EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
- Guardrail
- A guardrail is a runtime control placed around a model, such as input and output moderation that blocks or safely modifies harmful requests and responses. Amazon's framework calls these harmful content guardrails a "first and last line of defense".
- Source: Amazon's Frontier Model Safety Framework
- Usage policy
- A usage policy is a developer's published rules on what people may and may not do with its models. Anthropic's RSP pairs it with measures to detect and act on violations quickly, and calls for an internal usage policy binding employees.
- Source: Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4, effective 8 Jul 2026
- Refusal training
- Refusal training is fine-tuning a model to decline requests that would help cause severe harm, or to give low-risk answers instead. OpenAI lists it as an example safeguard supporting the claim that malicious users cannot elicit a dangerous capability.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
- Model-external safeguard
- A model-external safeguard works outside the model's own behaviour, for example by blocking an output or detecting it with offline monitoring so the harm can be addressed later. Anthropic uses the term for this class of mitigation.
- Source: Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §4.5
“Our models are subject to a variety of different safeguards, depending on their capability levels.”
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdfGoogle DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1, glossary
“Deployment Mitigations: are safety measures we implement which are intended to counter the misuse or misaligned expression of critical capabilities in deployments.”
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/DeepMind.com/Blog/strengthening-our-frontier-safety-framework/frontier-safety-framework_3-1.pdfMETR, (element level)
“Model Deployment Mitigations: Access and model-level measures applied to prevent the unauthorized use of a model's dangerous capabilities.”
https://metr.org/
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 | “"Our models are subject to a variety of different safeguards, depending on their capability levels." Factors that vary include robustness, coverage and exemptions (§4.5); footnote 59: "our models and safeguards now vary along many dimensions, so we are no longer using this terminology" (of "ASL-3" and "ASL-2"). "Required Safeguards": "a default set of required safeguards that are expected to bring risk down to acceptable levels"” The "Required Safeguards" definition is from an earlier Anthropic policy as quoted by the Frontier Model Forum (s3.2), not from the August 2026 Risk Report, which no longer uses ASL-era safeguard terminology (footnote 59). | exactEQ confidence: high | Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 |
| OpenAIShadow mapping OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 / GPT-5.6 deployment safety | “"Safeguards Report" (§4.2); "Each capability threshold has a corresponding class of risk-specific safeguard guidelines under the Preparedness Framework." (§4.1); the GPT-5.6 card's "Preparedness Safeguards" are those deployed for "the two areas" rated High” | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 | “"Deployment Mitigations: are safety measures we implement which are intended to counter the misuse or misaligned expression of critical capabilities in deployments." "Security Mitigations: ... intended to prevent the unauthorized modification or exfiltration of model weights"” | exactEQ confidence: high | Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 |
| xAIShadow mapping Frontier AI Framework, 30 Jun 2026 | “"Safety training: 'Training our models to recognize and decline harmful requests.'" "System prompts". "Filters: 'Applying classifiers to verify safety when a model is queried regarding topics of CRBN [sic] risks'"” xAI's Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026) carries PDF metadata reading "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC" with no xAI statement found disambiguating draft from final; treat this citation as provisional. | closeCL confidence: medium | xAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 June 2026 (draft-labeled PDF metadata) |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “Table 1 measures ("Deploy with mitigations"); LlamaFirewall; Llama Defender program” | closeCL confidence: medium | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Commitment 5 "Safety mitigations" (training-data filtering, input/output monitoring and filtering, refusal fine-tuning, staged/gated access, "high-assurance quantitative safety guarantees", CoT-transparency techniques) and Commitment 6 "Security mitigations"; a model is "exempt from [Commitment 6] if the model's capabilities are inferior to the capabilities of at least one model for which the parameters are publicly available for download."” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| California SB 53Shadow mapping California SB 53 | “"Mitigations" undefined (framework topic (3))” SB 53 requires labs to describe mitigations but never defines the term itself — the gap is the finding, recorded rather than dropped. | noneDU confidence: low | California SB 53 |
| METRShadow mapping METR (metr.org) | “"Model Deployment Mitigations: Access and model-level measures applied to prevent the unauthorized use of a model's dangerous capabilities."” | exactEQ confidence: high | METR |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- Frontier Model Forum
"Safeguards: Improving defenses against known attack methods, such as adversarial inputs or data poisoning, for safety and security purposes only" (Table 3, a use category) — related, not a mapping.
Frontier Model Forum, Information Sharing / Incident Reporting Issue Brief







