Examples
Examples from published documents
- Anthropic lists ten notable controls, including "Egress bandwidth controls: Network-level restrictions that limit data transfer rates out of sensitive environments, making large-scale exfiltration of multi-terabyte model weights more time-consuming and detectable." (Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §6.4.2)
- The EU Code requires "ensuring model parameters are always encrypted during transportation and storage as appropriate, including encryption with at least 256-bit security and with encryption keys stored securely on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)" (EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Appendix 4.2)
- OpenAI: "Model weights are protected through encryption (at rest and in transit), continuous monitoring, and access controls (e.g., multi-factor authentication, multi-party approval, and detailed logging)." (OpenAI Frontier Governance Framework, security mitigations)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A security level, such as RAND SL3, is a grade for the whole security posture; an individual control like hardware security keys is evidence toward a level, not a level itself.
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Defense in depth
- Defense in depth is the security practice of layering several independent controls so that an attack must defeat more than one of them. RAND describes it as multiple layers of security controls that provide redundancy in case some controls fail.
- Source: RAND, Securing AI Model Weights: Preventing Theft and Misuse of Frontier Models (Nevo et al., 2024, RR-A2849-1)
- Two-person control
- Two-person control (multi-party access control, 2PC) requires a second employee to approve access to model weights or other sensitive resources, so that one compromised account or person cannot grant unauthorised access alone. Anthropic lists it among its notable security controls.
- Source: Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §6.4.2, control 2 (Multi-party access controls (2PC))
“Requires a second employee to approve access requests for model weights and other sensitive resources, making it harder for single points of compromise to enable unauthorized access.”
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdfEU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Appendix 4.2, point (3)
“ensuring model parameters are always encrypted during transportation and storage as appropriate, including encryption with at least 256-bit security and with encryption keys stored securely on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)”
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 | “Ten numbered controls (§6.4.2), including "Egress bandwidth controls", "Multi-party access controls (2PC)" ("Requires a second employee to approve access requests for model weights and other sensitive resources"), "Binary allowlisting", "Hardware security keys for authentication", "Device authorization", "Restricted session lengths for privileged access" ("Privileged cloud identities require re-authentication hourly") and "Network source policies on privileged resources"” | exactEQ confidence: high | Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 |
| OpenAIShadow mapping OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 / Frontier Governance Framework | “C.3 practice families: "Security Threat Modeling and Risk Management; Defense in Depth; Access Management; Secure Development and Supply Chain; Operational Security; Auditing and Transparency"; FGF categories: "Protection of unreleased model weights; Hardening interface-access to unreleased model parameters; Insider threats; Security assurance"” The second list ("Protection of unreleased model weights; ...; Security assurance") is section headings from OpenAI's Frontier Governance Framework, not from PF v2. | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 | “SL2+ measures: "dedicated insider risk teams; background checks and ID verification for personnel with sensitive access; review of model training data for signs of tampering; mandating that the processing of untrusted inputs occurs within sandboxed environments; advanced red-teaming that simulates well-resourced adversaries ...; and proactive threat hunting with 24/7 incident response capabilities"” | exactEQ confidence: high | Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 |
| xAIShadow mapping Frontier AI Framework, 30 Jun 2026 | “"xAI has implemented appropriate information security standards, adopted based on the NIST 800-171 Rev.3 framework and supported by SOC 2 Type II evaluations." Measures include weight encryption, RBAC and anti-distillation” xAI's Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026) carries PDF metadata reading "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC" with no xAI statement found disambiguating draft from final; treat this citation as provisional. | closeCL confidence: medium | xAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 June 2026 (draft-labeled PDF metadata) |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “Weight access controls only (Table 1)” | narrowNR confidence: medium | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| California SB 53Shadow mapping California SB 53 | “Framework topic "(7) Cybersecurity practices to secure unreleased model weights from unauthorized modification or transfer by internal or external parties."” | broadBR confidence: medium | California SB 53 |
| METRShadow mapping METR (metr.org) | “"Model Weight Security" (element level)” | broadBR confidence: medium | METR |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Appendix 4.1-4.5 lists specific, numbered security-mitigation objectives and measures: general security (MFA, zero-trust, phishing defences); protection of unreleased model parameters (a "secure internal registry", encryption "with at least 256-bit security" with keys "stored securely on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)", confidential computing via "hardware-based, and attested trusted execution environments"); hardening interface access (access reviews "at least every six months"); insider threats (background checks, sandboxing against self-exfiltration, training-data tamper checks); and security assurance (independent external security reviews, red-teaming, bug bounties, EDR/IDS tooling, a security team for incident handling)” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| AmazonShadow mapping Amazon, Frontier Model Safety Framework | “Secure compute (EC2 Nitro, isolated VPCs; "Zero Operator Access" services where "AWS has entirely eliminated all human access to service hosts", validated by an NCC Group third-party design review), data protection (AES-256 GCM, FIPS 140-2 Level 3 KMS, "Critical Permission Groups" that are "regularly audited"), two-person rules governing "all code check-ins", and a mandatory central-team "full security and safety review" for "all software and AI projects"” | exactEQ confidence: high | Amazon, Frontier Model Safety Framework |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- Frontier Model Forum
"Threats" information category includes "cyber-threat indicators" (Table 2) — related, not a mapping.
Frontier Model Forum, Information Sharing / Incident Reporting Issue Brief







