Threat-Actor Profile

NIKOLAI editorial proposal (unsourced): a threat-actor profile is the capability, resource and access class of the adversary a threshold, evaluation or safeguard is calibrated against, expressed as a value on a ladder (e.g. novice/individual through nation-state) rather than as free text. This is element B3 of the source crosswalk.

This is CASRAI's own proposed definition, not a definition any named organisation has agreed to. See what NIKOLAI is and is not.

Source of record

Where this definition comes from

Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §4.1, §2.11.1, §6.4.1 fn90
“CB-1: "Individuals or small groups with limited resources"; CB-2: "Moderately resourced threat actors (including, for example, expert-backed teams)" (§4.1). "Sophisticated insiders": "insiders who have persistent access or can request time-limited access to systems that process model weights" (§6.4.1 fn 90).”
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdf
Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report / FSF v3.1, report p.16
“Threat Actor Capability levels "TAC-1" ("programmer with limited cybersecurity knowledge (e.g., 'script kiddie')") to "TAC-4" ("95th+ percentile cybersecurity expert (e.g., nation-state-sponsored groups)") (report p.16).”
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini_3-7_flash_fsf_report.pdf

Crosswalk

How named organisations use this concept

Every row below is a shadow mapping. It is CASRAI's own reading of a published document. No lab, evaluator or regulator named here has declared, endorsed, or been consulted on this mapping. That will change only when an organisation files its own Mapping Declaration — see the non-endorsement policy.

Organisation	Their term, as published	Match	Source
Anthropic Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026	“CB-1: "Individuals or small groups with limited resources"; CB-2: "Moderately resourced threat actors (including, for example, expert-backed teams)" (§4.1). "Medium-strength attacker": "an attacker with the strength that a human red-teamer shows when editing a transcript without iterating against a monitor ..." (§2.11.1). "Sophisticated insiders": "insiders who have persistent access or can request time-limited access to systems that process model weights" (§6.4.1 fn 90).”	exact confidence: high	Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 / GPT-5.6 deployment safety report	“"Novice actor (Bio): anyone with a basic relevant technical background" (Table 1). Critical: "The model can enable an expert to develop a highly dangerous novel threat vector" (Table 1). GPT-5.6: "Spray and pray operations": "broad exploitation by moderately skilled, low-resourced individuals and small groups" (s.9.4.1.2).”	close confidence: high	OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
Google DeepMind Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report / FSF v3.1	“"Provides low to medium resourced actors uplift in reference scenarios" (CBRN Uplift 1 CCL). Threat Actor Capability levels "TAC-1" ("programmer with limited cybersecurity knowledge (e.g., 'script kiddie')") to "TAC-4" ("95th+ percentile cybersecurity expert (e.g., nation-state-sponsored groups)") (report p.16). FSF refers to RAND "OC3 groups" without defining them (p.11).”	exact confidence: high	Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
xAI xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026)	“Security Goal threat actors: "sophisticated non-state actors, insider threats, state-sponsored actors and other foreseeable actors" (s.2.4). This is a security-only construct, narrower than the malicious-use threat-actor profiles used elsewhere in the corpus.” PDF metadata /Title reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final was found.	narrow confidence: medium	xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026, draft-marked)
Meta Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2	“Scenarios cover "both state and non-state actors" and distinguish "high- and low-skill actors" (para., §1.1); CB 1: "Proliferation of known medium-impact biological or chemical weapons for low and moderate skill actors" (§3.4).”	close confidence: high	Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
EU EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter	“Measure 6.1 "Security Goal": Signatories "will define a goal that specifies the threat actors that their security mitigations are intended to protect against ..., including non-state external threats, insider threats, and other expected threat actors, taking into account at least the current and expected capabilities of their models" — a security-only threat-actor construct, distinct from malicious-use threat-actor profiles used elsewhere in the corpus, confirming xAI's own adoption of the same term.” Row also cites xAI's Frontier AI Framework, whose PDF metadata is marked "DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC" with no disambiguating xAI statement found.	close confidence: high	EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter

Related, not mapped

Pointers that are not crosswalk claims

These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.

Frontier Model Forum
"Heightened Marginal Risk" examples (e.g. "enabling low-skilled actors to build chemical weapons previously restricted to well-resourced states") and FMF35's "Threats" examples that mention "potential threat actors" are related context, not a defined threat-actor-profile construct — scored RL (related, not a mapping) in the source document.
FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds / Information Sharing, Incident Reporting and Incident Response