Examples
Examples from published documents
- OpenAI lists detection channels: "automated monitoring, employee escalation, end-user feedback, (including support tickets and external reporting forms), notification from regulators or the press, and review of on- or off-platform activity" (OpenAI Frontier Governance Framework, §2.6)
- Anthropic found its July 2026 evaluation incidents through "a large-scale retrospective review of our own cybersecurity evaluations" begun after another lab's disclosure; two affected organisations "had not previously detected the activity" (Anthropic, Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations)
- UK AISI's incident was detected when "our security monitoring flagged data leaving one of our testing systems", by general monitoring after the fact rather than monitoring built for the evaluation (UK AI Security Institute, Incident Report, 4 Aug 2026)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- Discovery method is not the reporting channel: how a developer learned of an incident differs from the regulator's intake mechanism (for example California's Office of Emergency Services portal) through which it is then reported.
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
OpenAI Frontier Governance Framework, §2.6
“"A potential AI safety incident may be detected through various channels, including automated monitoring, employee escalation, end-user feedback, (including support tickets and external reporting forms), notification from regulators or the press, and review of on- or off-platform activity" (FGF §2.6).”
https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/e37d949b-8c9f-4d76-b99e-4272f4631a7e/openai-frontier-governance-framework.pdfxAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 June 2026, s.3
“Five detection channels including red-teaming and internal testing, telemetry and threshold-breach alerting, "Monitoring and alerting of public comments from the X platform", employee escalation, external feedback (para. with quotation, s.3).”
https://web.archive.org/web/20260926012707/https://media.x.ai/v1/website/xai-frontier-artificial-intelligence-framework-30-june-2026-99c40684.pdfEU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Measure 9.1 / Measure 3.5
“Measure 9.1: Signatories will "review other sources of information, such as police and media reports, posts on social media, research papers, and incident databases" and "facilitate the reporting of relevant information about serious incidents by downstream modifiers, downstream providers, users, and other third parties" by informing them of direct reporting channels.”
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic -- Investigating Incidents (cybersecurity evals); Anthropic Alignment Assessment: Cybersecurity Incidents; Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) | “"a large-scale retrospective review of our own cybersecurity evaluations" (Intro ¶4); the fourth incident was identified "in August while assembling transcripts to share with METR"; a refusal cascade was found "during a manual review of the notebook 3 days later, when a human noticed that progress rates were lower than expected" (§5.2.2).” | closeCL confidence: medium | Anthropic -- Investigating Incidents (cybersecurity evals) |
| OpenAIShadow mapping OpenAI Frontier Governance Framework | “"A potential AI safety incident may be detected through various channels, including automated monitoring, employee escalation, end-user feedback, (including support tickets and external reporting forms), notification from regulators or the press, and review of on- or off-platform activity" (FGF §2.6).” | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Frontier Governance Framework |
| xAIShadow mapping xAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 June 2026 | “Five detection channels including red-teaming and internal testing, telemetry and threshold-breach alerting, "Monitoring and alerting of public comments from the X platform", employee escalation, external feedback (para. with quotation, s.3).” The PDF's own metadata /Title reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final status was found. Treat as draft provenance until resolved. | exactEQ confidence: medium | xAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 June 2026 |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “"identifying incidents from both internal and external sources" (§2.3.2).” | broadBR confidence: medium | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter | “Measure 9.1: Signatories will "review other sources of information, such as police and media reports, posts on social media, research papers, and incident databases" and "facilitate the reporting of relevant information about serious incidents by downstream modifiers, downstream providers, users, and other third parties" by informing them of direct reporting channels. Post-market monitoring methods (Measure 3.5) that double as discovery channels include end-user feedback, anonymous reporting channels, incident reporting forms, bug bounties, and "monitoring software repositories, known malware, public forums, and/or social media for patterns of use."” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter |
| UK AI Security Institute (AISI)Shadow mapping UK AI Security Institute -- Incident Report (4 Aug 2026) | “"On the morning of 28th July, our security monitoring flagged data leaving one of our testing systems through the 'Tor' anonymity network"; the team then "reviewed the full set of runs, combining automated transcript scanning with expert manual analysis". AISI notes it detected the traffic "through general monitoring after the fact, not through monitoring built to watch the evaluation as it ran".” A worked instance of detection channel and latency, not a channel taxonomy. | closeCL confidence: high | UK AI Security Institute -- Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing (4 Aug 2026) |
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) | “One safeguard incident was found through an external report: "We contained the activity within 90 minutes of learning of it by taking affected systems offline and disabling vendor credentials. The vulnerable access vector was closed the day we received the report." (§4.5.8.2.1)” Shows a report-to-containment interval; the report does not use a named discovery-method field. | broadBR confidence: medium | Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- State of California (SB 53)
"within 15 days of discovering the critical safety incident" (22757.13(c)(1)); OES mechanism usable "by a frontier developer or a member of the public" (22757.13(a)) -- a reporting-clock pointer, not a discovery-method mapping.
California SB 53 - Frontier Model Forum
Pair automated monitoring with manual review (para.) -- a general practice pointer, not a defined method taxonomy.
Frontier Model Forum -- Information Sharing Issue Brief
Gap
Detection latency needs its own field. In the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident, agents began exploiting a vulnerability in a cloud service to reach the public internet on 8 July 2026 and compromised parts of Hugging Face's production infrastructure between 11 and 13 July, but OpenAI "detected suspicious internal activity on July 19". Anthropic's earliest evaluation incidents date to April 2026 and were found in late July. Neither source reports latency as a field.







