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v2026.11,858 entries · CC-BY 4.0
NIKOLAI elementN8 · Transparency and reviewProposednikolai-v0.1

External Review

NIKOLAI proposal: an External Review is a record of an assessment performed by a party outside the model developer -- of a model, a risk report, a safeguard, or compliance with a framework -- capturing the review's type, scope, and output. This working definition and the record shape below are NIKOLAI's own editorial synthesis; no lab, evaluator or regulator has endorsed it.

This is CASRAI's own proposed definition, not a definition any named organisation has agreed to. See what NIKOLAI is and is not.

Source of record

Where this definition comes from

  • Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026, §1.3.5

    Version 3.2 of our RSP authorizes Anthropic's Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT) to request external review of risk reports, gives the LTBT the power to approve our selection of external reviewers ... every part of any unredacted risk report is reviewed by at least one such reviewer.

    https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdf
  • EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter, Appendix 3.5; Measures 7.2, 7.4

    Signatories will ensure that adequately qualified independent external evaluators conduct model evaluations pursuant to this Appendix 3, with regards to the systemic risk, unless the model is exempt as 'similarly safe or safer' or Signatories cannot find qualified evaluators 'despite using early search efforts (such as through a public call open for 20 business days).'

    https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119
  • METR, accountability element

    External scrutiny ensures that a company's safety claims can be independently validated by qualified experts.

    https://metr.org/

Crosswalk

How named organisations use this concept

Every row below is a shadow mapping. It is CASRAI's own reading of a published document. No lab, evaluator or regulator named here has declared, endorsed, or been consulted on this mapping. That will change only when an organisation files its own Mapping Declaration — see the non-endorsement policy.
OrganisationTheir term, as publishedMatchSource
Anthropic
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
Version 3.2 of our RSP authorizes Anthropic's Long-Term Benefit Trust (LTBT) to request external review of risk reports, gives the LTBT the power to approve our selection of external reviewers ... every part of any unredacted risk report is reviewed by at least one such reviewer. The LTBT has not requested an external review (nor has the RSP required it), though pilot external reviews continue.
Also draws on the Advanced AI Framework's evaluator-review contents (AAF p.8) {AAF}.
exact
confidence: high
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
OpenAI
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 / Frontier Governance Framework
"then when available and feasible, OpenAI will work with third-parties to independently evaluate models" (PF §5.2); "We may solicit and obtain input from external experts" (FGF §5).
Also cites Frontier Governance Framework §5 {FGF}.
close
confidence: medium
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
Google DeepMind
Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
"External safety testing" by "specialist independent groups"; "The independent external evaluators explore frontier safety risk domains, however they do not directly comment on risk thresholds as contemplated under our FSF." (p.6)close
confidence: medium
Gemini 3.7 Flash FSF report
EU
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
"Signatories will ensure that adequately qualified independent external evaluators conduct model evaluations pursuant to this Appendix 3, with regards to the systemic risk", unless exempt as 'similarly safe or safer' or unable to find qualified evaluators 'despite using early search efforts.' Model Report must explain 'the choice of evaluator based on the qualification criteria' and whether independent evaluator input 'informed' the decision to proceed (Measures 7.2, 7.4).exact
confidence: high
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security Chapter
California SB 53
California SB 53
Framework topic "(5) Using third parties to assess the potential for catastrophic risks and the effectiveness of mitigations of catastrophic risks"; transparency report summary of "(C) The extent to which third-party evaluators were involved."close
confidence: medium
California SB 53
US Government (NIST CAISI) / UK AI Safety Institute (AISI) partnership
NIST CAISI bulletin; DeepMind UK AISI partnership post
CAISI: "CAISI will conduct pre-deployment evaluations and targeted research to better assess frontier AI capabilities." UK AISI with DeepMind: "partnered with the UK AISI since its inception in November 2023 to test our most capable models."
Also cites {AISI}.
close
confidence: medium
NIST CAISI bulletin
METR
METR (site)
"External scrutiny ensures that a company's safety claims can be independently validated by qualified experts."exact
confidence: high
METR
Frontier Model Forum
FMF Third-Party Assessments technical report
"Third-party assessment: 'Third-party assessments can be conducted on frontier models to confirm evaluations or claims on critical safety capabilities and mitigations.'" Functions: "Confirmation", "Robustness", "Supplementation".exact
confidence: high
FMF Third-Party Assessments
G42
G42 Frontier Safety Framework
"G42 will engage in annual external audits to verify compliance with the Framework" (s.5).close
confidence: medium
G42 Frontier Safety Framework
Anthropic
Policy on the AI Exponential (Amodei essay)
"Models above a threshold of compute should undergo mandatory testing by a qualified third party for their level of risk in four specific areas: cybersecurity, biological weapons, loss of control of AI systems, and automated R&D." Delivery left as a choice between "a government agency (similar to the FAA)" or "a set of private organizations that are authorized and inspected by the government ... (a 'regulatory markets' approach)."
Proposes a distinct, two-track mandatory external-review architecture separate from the voluntary/embedded-evaluator model in {PACE}; neither track specifies evaluator access level, publication rights or independence criteria -- a gap the essay itself does not fill.
close
confidence: medium
Policy on the AI Exponential
US Congress (H.R. 9925, FRONTIER Act, not enacted)
FRONTIER Act, 119th Congress
"A very large frontier developer shall grant an IVO timely access upon request to unredacted materials, records, personnel, systems, and all other information reasonably necessary for conducting the assessments," with assessments "not less frequently than once every 6 months" (Sec. 5). Large frontier developers separately "commission an annual independent compliance audit" that a named "lead auditor" signs to certify (Sec. 4(c)).
Richest independent-verification-organization licensing design in the corpus, but ties to a mandatory-audit model rather than an embedded-evaluator or publication-rights framing: IVO access is 'upon request,' not standing employee-like access, and the bill 'does not settle publication rights for assessors beyond the redacted public copy.' Not enacted.
close
confidence: medium
FRONTIER Act, 119th Congress (H.R. 9925, introduced, not enacted)

Related, not mapped

Pointers that are not crosswalk claims

These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.

  • xAI

    "There is no commitment to external or third-party evaluation" (brief finding, June 2026). Cards separately state "third-party testing shows that Grok 4's end-to-end offensive cyber capabilities remain below the level of a human professional" and that third-party evaluators "corroborated" Grok 4.6 cyber results -- RL, a pointer not a mapping.

    xAI Frontier AI Framework, 30 Jun 2026
  • Meta

    External experts used in threat-modeling workshops, risk assessments "where appropriate" and red teaming "when appropriate" -- RL, a pointer not a mapping.

    Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2

Referenced across the research world

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