Examples
Examples from published documents
- OpenAI announced "a two-week pause in reinforcement learning (RL) training on our latest models intended for deployment" and said "Our largest planned frontier RL run remains on hold" (OpenAI, "Pacing model development in an era of cyber-critical capabilities")
- "If we have not developed adequate dangerous capability evaluations by the time these benchmark thresholds are exceeded, we will halt further model development until our dangerous capability evaluations are ready." (Magic AGI Readiness Policy)
- For Critical capability in each Tracked Category: "Until we have specified safeguards and security controls that would meet a Critical standard, halt further development" (OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, Table 1)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A decision not to release a model for commercial reasons is not a halt condition, because it is not tied to a pre-declared safety trigger.
- Restricting or withdrawing a deployed model after an incident is an incident response, unless the framework stated that trigger and response in advance.
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Red line
- A red line is a limit an organisation says must not be crossed. Magic's AGI Readiness Policy says that if risk for a threat model passes a red line, it will adopt safety measures, in the worst case delaying or pausing development.
- Source: Magic AGI Readiness Policy
- Pause commitment
- A pause commitment is a stated intention to stop or slow AI development or deployment under defined conditions. Some are conditional: the Anthropic Institute says Anthropic expects it would pause if verification systems existed and other frontier developers also paused verifiably.
- Source: Anthropic Institute, "When AI builds itself"
- Go/no-go decision
- A go/no-go decision is the final decision whether a model is deployed, made after reviewing evaluation and safeguard reports. OpenAI's Preparedness Framework assigns it to company leadership; Amazon's framework assigns it to senior leadership.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
OpenAI "Pacing model development for cyber capabilities", August 2026 statement
“"a two-week pause in reinforcement learning (RL) training on our latest models intended for deployment"; "Our largest planned frontier RL run remains on hold."”
https://openai.com/index/pacing-model-development-cyber-capabilities/Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2, §3.3
“"we will only continue development of the Frontier AI if our risk assessments are complete and safeguards are defined, implemented and validated to reduce risk to the moderate or lower risk threshold" (§3.3).”
https://ai.meta.com/static-resource/Meta_Advanced-AI-Scaling-Framework-v2EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter, Measure 4.2
“Measure 4.2: "Signatories will only proceed with the development, the making available on the market, and/or the use of the model, if the systemic risks stemming from the model are determined to be acceptable."”
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/118119
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Risk Report / Amodei essay / Anthropic Institute post / Advanced AI Framework | “No explicit halt clause in the Risk Report itself; it says "We do not believe the ideal ecosystem would require a pause on developing models like these until they could be kept under even stronger model weight security. This also is not an obvious call" (§4.6.2). Amodei's Global Pacing Level 4: "full pacing, or even 'pause'". AAF remedy: "Prohibitions on deployment of further covered models until the developer corrects the violations" (p.11). Anthropic Institute post describes Anthropic expecting it "would slow down or temporarily pause, if other developers at or near the frontier also did so in a verifiable manner," and that "a credible pause also has to specify what triggers it, what lifts it, and who adjudicates."” The Anthropic Institute wording is verified against the page at https://www.anthropic.com/institute/recursive-self-improvement ("What should we do" section); it is a conditional, reciprocal expectation, not a unilateral commitment. | narrowNR confidence: medium | Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026 |
| OpenAIShadow mapping Preparedness Framework v2 / "Pacing model development for cyber capabilities" / "An Alien Mind" | “PF Critical: "halt further development" until Critical-standard safeguards and security controls are specified (Table 1). August 2026: "a two-week pause in reinforcement learning (RL) training on our latest models intended for deployment"; "Our largest planned frontier RL run remains on hold." Operational stop rule: "If they cannot conclusively determine within 30 minutes that the flag is a false positive, those teams are expected to pause the activity." Jakub Pachocki (OpenAI Chief Scientist), "An Alien Mind": "OpenAI will continue to seek technical solutions to alignment and monitoring, to build defensive systems and unilaterally withhold further scaling as needed; however, I believe broader interventions are required" — no trigger, threshold, evidence standard or named decision-maker specified for this conditional commitment.” | exactEQ confidence: high | OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 |
| xAIShadow mapping xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026) | “"xAI will only proceed with the development, the making available on the market, and/or the use of the model, if the systemic risks stemming from the model are determined to be acceptable." (s.2.3). "we may temporarily fully shut down the relevant system until we have developed a more targeted response" (s.3).” PDF metadata /Title reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final was found. | closeCL confidence: high | xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026, draft-marked) |
| MetaShadow mapping Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 | “"we will only continue development of the Frontier AI if our risk assessments are complete and safeguards are defined, implemented and validated to reduce risk to the moderate or lower risk threshold" (§3.3). Change log: "Critical threshold changed from 'Stop' to 'Develop with Mitigations.'"” | closeCL confidence: high | Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2 |
| EUShadow mapping EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter | “Measure 4.2: "Signatories will only proceed with the development, the making available on the market, and/or the use of the model, if the systemic risks stemming from the model are determined to be acceptable." If not acceptable: "(1) not make the model available on the market, restrict the making available on the market ..., withdraw, or recall the model, as necessary; (2) implement safety and/or security mitigations ...; and (3) conduct another round of" risk identification, analysis and acceptance determination. No named authority to lift a halt beyond re-running the process.” | exactEQ confidence: high | EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter |
| METRShadow mapping METR Common Elements | “"Conditions for Halting Deployment Plans: Commitments to stop deploying models if the AI capabilities of concern emerge before the appropriate mitigations can be put in place." "Conditions for Halting Development Plans: Commitments to halt model development if capabilities of concern emerge before the appropriate mitigations can be put in place."” | exactEQ confidence: high | METR (common-elements) |
| Frontier Model ForumShadow mapping FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds | “Frameworks "stipulate clear thresholds at which deployment or further development of a model may be paused" (s1.1).” | closeCL confidence: high | FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds |
| MicrosoftShadow mapping Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework (Feb 2026) | “"If ... we identify a risk we cannot sufficiently mitigate, we will pause development and deployment" (Sec. 4, p.8).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework (Feb 2026) |
| G42Shadow mapping G42 Frontier Safety Framework | “G42 pauses capability development if the required Security Mitigation Level cannot be met.” | exactEQ confidence: medium | G42 Frontier Safety Framework |
| MagicShadow mapping Magic AGI Readiness Policy | “Magic halts further model development until dangerous-capability evaluations are ready (see B8 quote).” | exactEQ confidence: medium | Magic AGI Readiness Policy |
| AnthropicShadow mapping Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4 | “Appendix A, "Anthropic in the lead" scenario: "We will delay AI development and deployment as needed to achieve this, until and unless we no longer believe we have a significant lead." Changelog, v3.1: "we may consider pausing development or deployment even where the commitments described in Appendix A are not triggered."” Competitor-contingent: the delay applies in named scenarios, and the lift condition is stated as Anthropic's own belief about its lead. | closeCL confidence: high | Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4 |
| AI Seoul Summit (Frontier AI Safety Commitments)Shadow mapping Frontier AI Safety Commitments, Commitment IV | “"Set out explicit processes they intend to follow if their model or system poses risks that meet or exceed the pre-defined thresholds. ... In the extreme, organisations commit not to develop or deploy a model or system at all, if mitigations cannot be applied to keep risks below the thresholds." (Commitment IV)” Voluntary commitment; no trigger values, invoking authority or lift criteria are specified. | closeCL confidence: high | Frontier AI Safety Commitments (AI Seoul Summit 2024) |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- US Government (Executive Order 14409)
EO 14409 excludes any "mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for the development, publication, release, or distribution of new AI models" (Sec. 3(c)). Related governance context, not a halt-condition rule.
Executive Order 14409
Gap
Several sources state, in general terms, what must be true for a halt to end (OpenAI: until Critical-standard safeguards are specified; Magic: until dangerous-capability evaluations are ready; Anthropic Appendix A: until it no longer believes it has a significant lead). The research did not find any source that names a party other than the developer's own leadership to decide that the condition has been met. OpenAI's August 2026 statement keeps its largest RL run on hold without stated resumption criteria.







