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NIKOLAI elementN3 · Thresholds and checkpointsProposednikolai-v0.3

Halt Condition

Definition

A halt condition is a pre-declared circumstance in which an AI developer will stop or pause training, development or deployment of a model, typically when a capability threshold is reached before adequate safeguards exist. A complete halt condition also says who can invoke the halt and what must be true to lift it.

Also called: Pause condition, Conditions for halting development, Conditions for halting deployment, Stop condition

NIKOLAI's proposed operational definition

NIKOLAI editorial proposal (unsourced): a halt condition is a declared condition under which development, training or deployment must stop, stating (where the source discloses it) the authority who may invoke it and the authority and evidence needed to lift it.

The operational definition is CASRAI's own proposal, not a definition any named organisation has agreed to. See what NIKOLAI is and is not, or browse the AI safety glossary.

Examples

Examples from published documents

  • OpenAI announced "a two-week pause in reinforcement learning (RL) training on our latest models intended for deployment" and said "Our largest planned frontier RL run remains on hold" (OpenAI, "Pacing model development in an era of cyber-critical capabilities")
  • "If we have not developed adequate dangerous capability evaluations by the time these benchmark thresholds are exceeded, we will halt further model development until our dangerous capability evaluations are ready." (Magic AGI Readiness Policy)
  • For Critical capability in each Tracked Category: "Until we have specified safeguards and security controls that would meet a Critical standard, halt further development" (OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2, Table 1)

Counter-examples

Not to be confused with

  • A decision not to release a model for commercial reasons is not a halt condition, because it is not tied to a pre-declared safety trigger.
  • Restricting or withdrawing a deployed model after an incident is an incident response, unless the framework stated that trigger and response in advance.

Related terms

Related AI safety terms

Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.

Red line
A red line is a limit an organisation says must not be crossed. Magic's AGI Readiness Policy says that if risk for a threat model passes a red line, it will adopt safety measures, in the worst case delaying or pausing development.
Source: Magic AGI Readiness Policy
Pause commitment
A pause commitment is a stated intention to stop or slow AI development or deployment under defined conditions. Some are conditional: the Anthropic Institute says Anthropic expects it would pause if verification systems existed and other frontier developers also paused verifiably.
Source: Anthropic Institute, "When AI builds itself"
Go/no-go decision
A go/no-go decision is the final decision whether a model is deployed, made after reviewing evaluation and safeguard reports. OpenAI's Preparedness Framework assigns it to company leadership; Amazon's framework assigns it to senior leadership.
Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2

Source of record

Where this definition comes from

Crosswalk

How named organisations use this concept

Every row below is a shadow mapping. A shadow row is CASRAI's own reading of a published document. No lab, evaluator or regulator named on a shadow row has declared, endorsed, or been consulted on it. That changes only when an organisation files its own Mapping Declaration.
OrganisationTheir term, as publishedMatch & verificationSource
AnthropicShadow mapping
Risk Report / Amodei essay / Anthropic Institute post / Advanced AI Framework
“No explicit halt clause in the Risk Report itself; it says "We do not believe the ideal ecosystem would require a pause on developing models like these until they could be kept under even stronger model weight security. This also is not an obvious call" (§4.6.2). Amodei's Global Pacing Level 4: "full pacing, or even 'pause'". AAF remedy: "Prohibitions on deployment of further covered models until the developer corrects the violations" (p.11). Anthropic Institute post describes Anthropic expecting it "would slow down or temporarily pause, if other developers at or near the frontier also did so in a verifiable manner," and that "a credible pause also has to specify what triggers it, what lifts it, and who adjudicates."”
The Anthropic Institute wording is verified against the page at https://www.anthropic.com/institute/recursive-self-improvement ("What should we do" section); it is a conditional, reciprocal expectation, not a unilateral commitment.
narrowNR
confidence: medium
Anthropic Risk Report, August 2026
OpenAIShadow mapping
Preparedness Framework v2 / "Pacing model development for cyber capabilities" / "An Alien Mind"
“PF Critical: "halt further development" until Critical-standard safeguards and security controls are specified (Table 1). August 2026: "a two-week pause in reinforcement learning (RL) training on our latest models intended for deployment"; "Our largest planned frontier RL run remains on hold." Operational stop rule: "If they cannot conclusively determine within 30 minutes that the flag is a false positive, those teams are expected to pause the activity." Jakub Pachocki (OpenAI Chief Scientist), "An Alien Mind": "OpenAI will continue to seek technical solutions to alignment and monitoring, to build defensive systems and unilaterally withhold further scaling as needed; however, I believe broader interventions are required" — no trigger, threshold, evidence standard or named decision-maker specified for this conditional commitment.”exactEQ
confidence: high
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
xAIShadow mapping
xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026)
“"xAI will only proceed with the development, the making available on the market, and/or the use of the model, if the systemic risks stemming from the model are determined to be acceptable." (s.2.3). "we may temporarily fully shut down the relevant system until we have developed a more targeted response" (s.3).”
PDF metadata /Title reads "Privileged/Confidential DRAFT working FRAMEWORK DOC"; no xAI statement disambiguating draft vs. final was found.
closeCL
confidence: high
xAI Frontier AI Framework (30 Jun 2026, draft-marked)
MetaShadow mapping
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
“"we will only continue development of the Frontier AI if our risk assessments are complete and safeguards are defined, implemented and validated to reduce risk to the moderate or lower risk threshold" (§3.3). Change log: "Critical threshold changed from 'Stop' to 'Develop with Mitigations.'"”closeCL
confidence: high
Meta Advanced AI Scaling Framework v2
EUShadow mapping
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter
“Measure 4.2: "Signatories will only proceed with the development, the making available on the market, and/or the use of the model, if the systemic risks stemming from the model are determined to be acceptable." If not acceptable: "(1) not make the model available on the market, restrict the making available on the market ..., withdraw, or recall the model, as necessary; (2) implement safety and/or security mitigations ...; and (3) conduct another round of" risk identification, analysis and acceptance determination. No named authority to lift a halt beyond re-running the process.”exactEQ
confidence: high
EU GPAI Code of Practice, Safety and Security chapter
METRShadow mapping
METR Common Elements
“"Conditions for Halting Deployment Plans: Commitments to stop deploying models if the AI capabilities of concern emerge before the appropriate mitigations can be put in place." "Conditions for Halting Development Plans: Commitments to halt model development if capabilities of concern emerge before the appropriate mitigations can be put in place."”exactEQ
confidence: high
METR (common-elements)
Frontier Model ForumShadow mapping
FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds
“Frameworks "stipulate clear thresholds at which deployment or further development of a model may be paused" (s1.1).”closeCL
confidence: high
FMF Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds
MicrosoftShadow mapping
Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework (Feb 2026)
“"If ... we identify a risk we cannot sufficiently mitigate, we will pause development and deployment" (Sec. 4, p.8).”exactEQ
confidence: high
Microsoft Frontier Governance Framework (Feb 2026)
G42Shadow mapping
G42 Frontier Safety Framework
“G42 pauses capability development if the required Security Mitigation Level cannot be met.”exactEQ
confidence: medium
G42 Frontier Safety Framework
MagicShadow mapping
Magic AGI Readiness Policy
“Magic halts further model development until dangerous-capability evaluations are ready (see B8 quote).”exactEQ
confidence: medium
Magic AGI Readiness Policy
AnthropicShadow mapping
Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4
“Appendix A, "Anthropic in the lead" scenario: "We will delay AI development and deployment as needed to achieve this, until and unless we no longer believe we have a significant lead." Changelog, v3.1: "we may consider pausing development or deployment even where the commitments described in Appendix A are not triggered."”
Competitor-contingent: the delay applies in named scenarios, and the lift condition is stated as Anthropic's own belief about its lead.
closeCL
confidence: high
Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4
AI Seoul Summit (Frontier AI Safety Commitments)Shadow mapping
Frontier AI Safety Commitments, Commitment IV
“"Set out explicit processes they intend to follow if their model or system poses risks that meet or exceed the pre-defined thresholds. ... In the extreme, organisations commit not to develop or deploy a model or system at all, if mitigations cannot be applied to keep risks below the thresholds." (Commitment IV)”
Voluntary commitment; no trigger values, invoking authority or lift criteria are specified.
closeCL
confidence: high
Frontier AI Safety Commitments (AI Seoul Summit 2024)
What do these codes mean?
exact
The source term is equivalent to this element
close
The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
broad
The source term is broader than this element
narrow
The source term is narrower than this element
none
No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
EQ
Equivalent
CL
Close
BR
Source is broader than the element
NR
Source is narrower than the element
FF
False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
DU
Declared but undefined by the source
UV
Unverified

Related, not mapped

Pointers that are not crosswalk claims

These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.

  • US Government (Executive Order 14409)

    EO 14409 excludes any "mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for the development, publication, release, or distribution of new AI models" (Sec. 3(c)). Related governance context, not a halt-condition rule.

    Executive Order 14409

Gap

Several sources state, in general terms, what must be true for a halt to end (OpenAI: until Critical-standard safeguards are specified; Magic: until dangerous-capability evaluations are ready; Anthropic Appendix A: until it no longer believes it has a significant lead). The research did not find any source that names a party other than the developer's own leadership to decide that the condition has been met. OpenAI's August 2026 statement keeps its largest RL run on hold without stated resumption criteria.

Referenced across the research world

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