Examples
Examples from published documents
- "We recommend a security level for each CCL, which reflects our assessment of the minimum appropriate level of security the field of frontier AI should apply to models reaching each CCL." (Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1, section 2.2)
- For automated R&D, Anthropic's recommendation for all developers "will likely require an internal Usage Policy and strong internal compartmentalization, controls and/or monitoring to restrict the ability of employees and contractors (up to and including the company's CEO as well as its most privileged technical employees) to circumvent the Usage Policy." (Anthropic RSP v3.4, section 1)
Counter-examples
Not to be confused with
- A developer's own planned mitigation is not an industry-wide recommendation: RSP v3.4 lists its recommendations and "our planned mitigations as a company" separately (Anthropic RSP v3.4, Introduction).
Related terms
Related AI safety terms
Terms defined under this element that are not NIKOLAI elements themselves, each as the cited document uses it. Every term is also listed in the AI safety glossary.
- Race to the bottom
- A race to the bottom, in frontier AI, is competitive pressure that pushes developers to weaken safety measures to keep pace with rivals. OpenAI's Preparedness Framework says it would keep safeguards "more protective than the other AI developer" to avoid one.
- Source: OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2
- Collective action problem
- A collective action problem arises when no single developer can keep catastrophic risk low alone because overall risk depends on what all developers do. Anthropic gives this as the reason RSP v3 separates industry-wide recommendations from its own plans.
- Source: Anthropic Responsible Scaling Policy v3.4
Source of record
Where this definition comes from
Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026), §4.8
“we do not expect to meet our ambitious industry-wide recommendations ... in time”
https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/f61d49fa5596956a5dec75fea0e973bf6a6a8378/Redacted%20Risk%20Report%20August%202026%20.pdfGoogle DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1, s.2.2
“We recommend a security level for each CCL, which reflects our assessment of the minimum appropriate level of security the field of frontier AI should apply to models reaching each CCL.”
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/DeepMind.com/Blog/strengthening-our-frontier-safety-framework/frontier-safety-framework_3-1.pdf
Crosswalk
How named organisations use this concept
| Organisation | Their term, as published | Match & verification | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| AnthropicShadow mapping Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) | “"recommendations for industry-wide safety" tables stated as "capability/usage threshold → substantive standards for model developers" (para., §3.10, §4.8). Automated R&D standard: internal Usage Policy controls binding employees and contractors "up to and including the company's CEO as well as its most privileged technical employees" (Table 3.10.A). "we do not expect to meet our ambitious industry-wide recommendations ... in time" (§4.8).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Anthropic Risk Report (August 2026) |
| Google DeepMindShadow mapping Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 | “"We recommend a security level for each CCL, which reflects our assessment of the minimum appropriate level of security the field of frontier AI should apply to models reaching each CCL." "we believe these recommendations will only be effective if the entire frontier AI field applies them" (s.2.2).” | exactEQ confidence: high | Google DeepMind Frontier Safety Framework v3.1 |
| Demis Hassabis (personal essay)Shadow mapping Hassabis, 'A Framework for Frontier AI' | “Frontier Labs "be encouraged to adopt best practices, such as publishing model cards with technical details, maintaining strong internal cybersecurity, vetting key personnel, and providing sufficient resourcing for safety and security research."” Hassabis's substack post is a personal essay, not a Google DeepMind policy document. | closeCL confidence: medium | Hassabis, 'A Framework for Frontier AI' |
What do these codes mean?
- exact
- The source term is equivalent to this element
- close
- The source term is close but not equivalent to this element
- broad
- The source term is broader than this element
- narrow
- The source term is narrower than this element
- none
- No mapping claim — used for false-friend and declared-but-undefined rows
- EQ
- Equivalent
- CL
- Close
- BR
- Source is broader than the element
- NR
- Source is narrower than the element
- FF
- False friend — same or similar label, different meaning
- DU
- Declared but undefined by the source
- UV
- Unverified
Related, not mapped
Pointers that are not crosswalk claims
These sources mention this concept but do not define or map it clearly enough to count as a crosswalk row — noted here so the research is visible without overstating it as a mapping.
- OpenAI
"in order to avoid a race to the bottom on safety, we keep our safeguards at a level more protective than the other AI developer, and share information to validate this claim." (§4.3)
OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2 - California SB 53
Disclosures "consistent with or superior to industry best practice" encouraged (22757.12(c)(4)).
California SB 53 - METR
"This report is descriptive, not prescriptive, and does not represent METR's recommendations."
METR - Frontier Model Forum
"One approach" (a stringent industry-wide baseline) floated, not adopted.
Frontier Model Forum, Risk Taxonomy and Thresholds
Gap
Anthropic and Google both publish recommendations they state they cannot or will not meet unilaterally. NIKOLAI should record `recommendation.selfConformance` (met / not met / expected not to be met) separately from the recommendation itself.







