On June 22, 2026, the President signed Executive Order 14411, “Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation”. Most of the order is aimed at accelerating domestic quantum computing, sensing, and networking commercialization — new funding vehicles, workforce programs, and supply-chain initiatives. But a smaller set of provisions speaks directly to research security and export control, and those are the ones that matter most for research administrators, sponsored-programs offices, and university technology transfer offices (TTOs) working with federally funded quantum information science and technology (QIST) research.
This page walks through what EO 14411 actually says on research security and export control, what it leaves to future rulemaking, and what it means in practice for institutions running federally funded QIST work. For the underlying deemed-export and foreign-national-access mechanics that EO 14411 sits on top of, see our companion guide, Quantum Computing Export Controls: Deemed Exports and Foreign-National Access Rules for University Quantum Research.
What Executive Order 14411 does
EO 14411 sets national policy to maintain a strategic technical advantage in QIST and to build a “robust and trusted” quantum ecosystem spanning research, manufacturing, commercialization, and application. It was issued alongside a companion order, EO 14409, “Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks,” which directs a government-wide shift to post-quantum encryption standards. Read together, the two orders form what several law firms tracking the rollout have described as a two-front strategy: one order accelerates quantum capability, the other defends against the cryptographic risk that capability creates.
On the innovation side, EO 14411 directs the Department of Energy to develop specifications for a Quantum Computer for Application Development and Discovery Science (QC‑ADDS) effort and explore private-sector delivery partnerships for DOE facilities, gives the National Science Foundation authority to fund QIST user facilities through the National Quantum and Nanotechnology Infrastructure program, and directs the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to update the National Quantum Strategy with an emphasis on commercialization and the domestic supply chain. It also directs Commerce, the Department of War (formerly Defense), Energy, and NSF to use prize challenges and advance market commitments to build out domestic quantum-component manufacturing, and it tasks NSF with standing up a network of National QIST Workforce Development Institutes.
The research-security provisions
The order directs the White House science and technology apparatus to coordinate with federal agencies so that QIST activities and policies “maintain robust and balanced security controls” over critical quantum information — balanced, per the order’s own framing, against the goal of not impeding domestic innovation. Concretely, it expands the existing Quantum Information Science and Technology Counterintelligence Protection Team (QCPT), an interagency body coordinated in part through the FBI, broadening its remit to address adversarial threats, including cybersecurity risks, and to share threat information with both industry and academic institutions.
For institutions that already have a NSPM-33 research security program in place covering the four mandated elements — cybersecurity, foreign-travel security, insider-threat, and research-security training — EO 14411 does not introduce a new, separate compliance regime. It reinforces the existing research-security apparatus and specifically flags QIST as a priority area where research security officers should expect closer agency attention, particularly around foreign-talent-program disclosures and any collaboration involving named countries of concern.
Export control: harmonization first, new rules later
The export-control language in EO 14411 is a directive to agencies, not a new regulatory text in itself. It instructs the Secretaries of State and Commerce to prevent countries of concern from acquiring “critical quantum-enabling technologies” by harmonizing research-security and export-control policy with allied nations, and separately directs efforts to keep supply chains and R&D collaboration open among trusted partner countries. Legal trackers following the order, including Baker McKenzie’s Global Sanctions and Export Controls team, note explicitly that the order does not itself impose specific new controls under the deemed export rules, the Export Administration Regulations, or ITAR — those would come through subsequent Commerce and State Department rulemaking, which the order sets in motion but does not complete.
That distinction matters operationally. Nothing in EO 14411 changes today’s classification of quantum hardware, software, or technical data under existing EAR/ITAR categories, and it does not by itself add a foreign national, institution, or country to any restricted list. What it does is signal, clearly, that quantum-specific export-control rulemaking is coming, and that CFIUS and export-licensing reviews touching quantum technology should be expected to tighten. TTOs and export-control officers should treat the current rules — not a rewritten set — as binding for now, while watching Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security for a quantum-specific rulemaking docket. For the mechanics of how deemed-export screening should already be built into lab onboarding regardless of this order, see Deemed Export Screening at Lab Onboarding: A PI Checklist.
What it means for federally funded QIST research
For PIs and sponsored-programs offices holding NSF, DOE, or other federal QIST awards, the most immediate effects of EO 14411 are additive funding infrastructure rather than new compliance burden: new NSF-funded user facilities under the National Quantum and Nanotechnology Infrastructure program, a DOE effort to make DOE-hosted quantum computers more accessible for application-development research, and new workforce-development institutes. Institutions applying to or already holding awards tied to these mechanisms should expect the agencies to layer research-security certifications — consistent with existing NSPM-33 and agency-specific requirements such as NSF’s research security training requirements — onto participation, since the order explicitly frames QIST funding growth and security controls as a paired policy, not separate tracks.
Institutions with active international QIST collaborations, particularly involving China or other designated countries of concern, should also anticipate closer scrutiny consistent with existing guidance on US-China research collaboration and malign foreign talent recruitment program disclosure requirements. EO 14411 doesn’t create new disclosure obligations on its own, but it raises the profile of quantum specifically within a compliance framework that already exists.
Implications for university technology transfer offices
For TTOs, EO 14411’s practical relevance is threefold. First, the order’s emphasis on prize challenges, advance market commitments, and public-private partnerships to build out domestic quantum-component manufacturing creates new potential licensing and industry-partnership pathways for quantum-related IP — see the general mechanics in our technology transfer process guide. Second, any licensing negotiation or material transfer involving quantum hardware, control software, or algorithms with foreign licensees or foreign-national researchers should continue to run through standard export-control compliance screening — classification, license determination, screening, and recordkeeping — since, as above, the underlying EAR/ITAR classifications have not changed yet. Third, TTOs negotiating quantum-related sponsored-research agreements or industry partnerships should watch for sponsor-side contract language that starts referencing EO 14411 research-security expectations even before any implementing rule is final; agencies and industry partners frequently begin incorporating a new order’s language into award terms ahead of formal rulemaking.
What to do now
- Confirm your institution’s NSPM-33 research security program already covers QIST-funded PIs and labs; EO 14411 raises QIST’s profile within that existing framework rather than replacing it.
- Do not assume any EAR/ITAR classification for quantum hardware, software, or technical data has changed — verify against current classifications, not against summaries of the order.
- Flag quantum-specific awards and industry partnerships for closer tracking of forthcoming Commerce/State rulemaking referenced in Section 9 of the order.
- Continue running standard deemed-export screening at lab onboarding for any foreign national joining quantum-funded research, per existing practice.
- Watch NSF and DOE award terms for new QIST funding mechanisms (national user facilities, QC-ADDS) for research-security certification requirements attached at the award stage.
Related CASRAI resources
- Quantum Computing Export Controls: Deemed Exports and Foreign-National Access Rules
- NSPM-33 Research Security Program Requirements: The Four Mandated Elements
- Export Control Reform and Research Security: What’s Changing and Why
- Deemed Export Screening at Lab Onboarding: A PI Checklist
- Research Security Officer (RSO)
- CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the US)
This page summarizes publicly available reporting and primary-source text on Executive Order 14411 as of its signing. Implementing rulemaking from the Departments of Commerce and State was not yet final at the time of writing; institutions should track official agency guidance directly as it is issued.
