CHIPS Act Countries of Concern: What Applies

“Countries of concern” is a defined statutory term in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-167), not a general phrase for any country a research office is wary of. It names four specific countries, sets out how more can be added, and triggers two concrete, already-in-force restrictions on federally funded research: a bar on malign foreign talent recruitment program participation, and a mandatory financial disclosure requirement above a set dollar threshold. This guide covers the list itself, how it is expanded, exactly which restrictions attach to it, and who is actually covered — and distinguishes it from a separate, newer, broader proposal that is easy to conflate with it.

The named list, and the statutory basis

The operative definition sits at 42 U.S.C. § 19221(a)(1), part of the CHIPS and Science Act’s Title VI research-security provisions (Chapter 163, Subchapter VI of Title 42). It defines “foreign country of concern” as:

The People’s Republic of China
The Russian Federation
The Islamic Republic of Iran
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
“Any other country determined to be a country of concern by” the Department of State

That last clause is the designation mechanism: the Secretary of State can add countries to the list without a further act of Congress. As of this writing, no additional country has been added beyond the four named in the statute itself, but the list is not fixed by its own terms — a research office should not treat “four countries” as a permanently closed set.

This is a narrower, older, and more concrete mechanism than the separate 2026 OMB proposal to amend the government-wide Uniform Guidance at 2 CFR 200.220. That proposal does not name any country itself; it uses a floating cross-reference to whatever a country happens to be designated as elsewhere in federal law (a “foreign adversary,” a “country of particular concern,” a country under national-security-related sanctions). See CASRAI’s coverage of the OMB 2026 covered foreign country proposal for that mechanism in full — the two should not be treated as interchangeable. The CHIPS Act list is a fixed, named roster with a defined amendment process; the OMB proposal, if finalized, would sweep in whatever countries other federal designations happen to name at any given moment, which is a materially different (and, critics argue, much broader and less predictable) scope. A compliance office tracking one is not automatically compliant with the other.

Which restrictions actually attach to the list

Being on the “foreign country of concern” list does not, by itself, ban a US researcher from any contact with that country. What it does is trigger two specific, statutorily defined obligations under CHIPS Act Title VI:

1. The malign foreign talent recruitment program (MFTRP) prohibition

Under 42 U.S.C. § 19231(b)(3) and § 19232, federal research agencies must prohibit research and development awards where a covered individual named in the proposal is participating in a “malign foreign talent recruitment program” — a defined category of compensated arrangement with a foreign country of concern (or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with one) that involves unauthorized transfer of IP, data, or other nonpublic information. This is the restriction with the most fully built-out agency compliance machinery to date: NSF and NIH both now require pre-award and, in NSF’s case, ongoing post-award certification. CASRAI covers the full statutory definition, the certification mechanics, and the consequences of non-compliance in a dedicated guide: Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program (MFTRP): Definition, Disclosure, and Consequences.

2. Foreign Financial Disclosure Reporting (FFDR)

Under CHIPS Act Section 10339B (42 U.S.C. § 19040), an institution of higher education must report gifts from, or contracts with, a foreign country of concern (or an entity domiciled there) totaling $50,000 or more within a reporting period. This sits alongside, but is legally distinct from, the Section 117 foreign-gift disclosure regime under the Higher Education Act — it is a CHIPS-Act-specific obligation tied specifically to the four countries of concern (plus any future Secretary of State designation), not a general foreign-funding disclosure rule. Institutions report through NSF’s designated portal on an annual cycle running July 1 through June 30; a negative report (confirming no reportable gifts or contracts) is required even when nothing crosses the threshold, and records must be retained for a period tied to the later of several statutory triggers. Unlike the MFTRP prohibition, FFDR does not bar an award outright — it is a disclosure obligation, and the consequence for non-compliance runs through the institution’s certification and reporting obligations rather than a per-proposal eligibility bar.

What is not automatically triggered by the list

Two adjacent, frequently confused restrictions are NOT simply “countries of concern” restrictions and should not be conflated with this list:

The Confucius Institute funding bar (CHIPS Act Section 10339A, 42 U.S.C. § 19039) withholds NSF funding from an institution of higher education that maintains a Confucius Institute contract. It is authorized separately from the countries-of-concern definition and applies regardless of whether the specific arrangement independently meets the countries-of-concern or MFTRP criteria.
Export control restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms Regulations run on their own licensing and country-group framework, administered by the Department of Commerce (BIS) and Department of State (DDTC) respectively — overlapping in practice with countries of concern for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but legally a separate compliance regime with its own restricted/denied party lists, license exceptions, and deemed-export rules. See CASRAI’s Export Control Reform and Research Security guide and ECCN Lookup Guide for Research Equipment for that separate framework.

Who is actually covered

The obligations attach differently depending on the restriction:

MFTRP certification is an individual obligation — each “covered individual” (generally senior/key personnel named on a federal research proposal) must certify personally that they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program — layered on top of an institutional certification that covered individuals have been made aware of, and have complied with, the requirement.
FFDR is an institutional obligation. It is the institution of higher education, not the individual researcher, that reports gifts and contracts and files the annual disclosure (including negative reports).
Both restrictions currently apply to federal research and development awards — they are not general restrictions on personal or institutional dealings with a country of concern that fall outside the federal grant-making relationship.

How this differs from the 2026 OMB proposal, in practice

Three practical differences a research office needs to track separately:

What triggers the restriction. The CHIPS Act list is fixed and named; a compliance office can check a proposal or gift against four specific countries plus any Secretary of State addition. The OMB proposal’s floating cross-reference means the effective scope can shift whenever another federal designation changes, without any CHIPS-Act-specific action.
What the restriction actually does. CHIPS Act restrictions are narrow and specific — an MFTRP participation bar and a disclosure threshold. The OMB 2026 proposal, if finalized as proposed, would be a much broader spending prohibition covering programmatic activity, data-sharing, travel, and allocable indirect costs tied to collaboration with a covered foreign country or entity.
Legal basis and status. The CHIPS Act restrictions are statute, already in force, with agency implementing notices (NSF Important Notice No. 149; NIH Common Forms/Guide Notice mechanics) built on top of them. The OMB proposal is a Uniform Guidance rulemaking under 2 CFR 200.220, not yet final as of this writing.

A research administrator should not assume compliance with one clears the other, and should not describe either mechanism using the other’s terminology — “countries of concern” (CHIPS Act, named list) and “covered foreign countries” (OMB proposal, floating cross-reference) are deliberately different terms for deliberately different mechanisms, even though they will often overlap in which specific countries end up covered in practice.

Frequently asked questions

Does the CHIPS Act countries-of-concern list ban collaboration with those countries entirely?

No. It does not impose a blanket ban on international collaboration with China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. It triggers two specific obligations — the malign foreign talent recruitment program participation bar and the Foreign Financial Disclosure Reporting threshold — not a general prohibition on research contact, publication, or open scholarly exchange with those countries.

Who decides if a new country gets added to the list?

The Secretary of State, under the designation authority in 42 U.S.C. § 19221(a)(1). No additional country has been designated beyond the four named in the statute as of this writing, but the mechanism exists and does not require new legislation to use.

Is this the same list used in the 2026 OMB Uniform Guidance proposal?

No. The OMB 2026 proposal to amend 2 CFR 200.220 does not use this list — it defines “covered foreign country” by cross-referencing other federal designations (foreign adversary status, country-of-particular-concern designations, sanctions-related restrictions), which is a different, floating definitional approach with potentially broader and more variable scope. See CASRAI’s OMB 2026 covered foreign country coverage for that mechanism.

Does a $10,000 gift from a covered country trigger a disclosure requirement?

Not under CHIPS Act FFDR specifically — that threshold is $50,000 or more (aggregated across gifts and contracts within the reporting period) from a foreign country of concern or an entity domiciled there. A smaller gift may still be reportable under a separate regime, such as Higher Education Act Section 117 foreign-gift disclosure, which has its own, different threshold and scope — the two disclosure regimes are not the same and should be checked independently.

Does an institution have to certify anything if none of its researchers work with a country of concern?

FFDR requires a negative report even when no gift or contract meets the $50,000 threshold — institutions cannot simply skip the filing because nothing is reportable in a given cycle.

Related CASRAI resources

Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program (MFTRP): Definition, Disclosure, and Consequences — full detail on the certification mechanics and consequences
OMB 2026 Covered Foreign Country Research Restriction — the separate, broader, not-yet-final proposal
US-China Research Collaboration: Research Security and Compliance Concerns
NSPM-33 Research Security Program Requirements: The Four Mandated Elements
Export Control Reform and Research Security
ECCN Lookup Guide for Research Equipment
CHIPS and Science Act
Research Security
Foreign talent recruitment programme