When a US export-control question involves not just an item or technology but a specific country, the governing framework usually isn’t the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) or the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) at all — it’s the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions program administered by the US Department of the Treasury. OFAC’s comprehensively-embargoed-countries list operates on a different logic than EAR/ITAR, and universities that only screen for controlled technology can still walk into an OFAC problem: comprehensive sanctions restrict transacting with a country or its government at all, regardless of whether any controlled item or technology is involved.
This guide covers the current OFAC comprehensive-sanctions list, how it differs from the EAR/ITAR country-specific licensing already covered in CASRAI’s EAR/ITAR and international research collaboration guide, and what comprehensive embargoes mean specifically for university research collaboration, travel, and technology transfer.
The OFAC comprehensively-embargoed countries list
OFAC administers dozens of sanctions programs, most of which are targeted — they restrict transactions with specific listed individuals, entities, sectors, or activities rather than an entire country. A much shorter list carries a comprehensive embargo, meaning virtually all transactions between US persons (including universities, their employees, and their students acting in that capacity) and the country or its government are prohibited absent a specific or general OFAC license.
As of this writing, OFAC’s comprehensively-sanctioned countries/territories are:
- Cuba — under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515)
- Iran — under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 560)
- North Korea (DPRK) — under the North Korea Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 510)
- Syria — under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 542)
- The Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions of Ukraine — under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations covering the Russian-occupied territories specifically, not Ukraine as a whole
Russia itself is not subject to a single comprehensive embargo of the same kind — it is instead covered by an extensive and still-expanding set of targeted sanctions programs (sectoral sanctions, specific-entity designations on the SDN List, export-control-adjacent restrictions) that in practice block most meaningful institutional engagement, but operate on a different legal mechanism than the four-country-plus-occupied-territories comprehensive list above. Belarus is similarly subject to extensive targeted, rather than comprehensive, sanctions. Treat “Russia is comprehensively embargoed” as a common but technically imprecise shorthand — for compliance purposes, confirm the specific program and designation rather than relying on the label.
This list changes with US foreign policy and should be verified directly against OFAC’s own Sanctions Programs and Country Information page before relying on it for an active collaboration decision — it is not static, and an institution’s export-control or research-security office, not this page, is the authoritative source for a current determination.
How OFAC sanctions differ from EAR/ITAR
Universities that already have an EAR/ITAR compliance process sometimes assume it also covers embargoed-country risk. It doesn’t fully, because the two regimes ask different questions:
- EAR/ITAR (item- and technology-based): “Is this specific item, software, or technical data controlled, and does sending or disclosing it to this destination or person require a license?” The EAR and ITAR framework is administered by the Commerce and State Departments respectively, and most fundamental research at US universities benefits from the fundamental-research exclusion, which removes it from EAR/ITAR licensing requirements as long as publication is unrestricted. See CASRAI’s EAR/ITAR and international research collaboration guide for how that exclusion works and where it stops applying — including deemed exports to foreign national researchers.
- OFAC (country- and person-based): “Is this transaction with a person, entity, or government located in — or the government of — an embargoed country?” This question is largely indifferent to whether a controlled item or technology is involved at all. Providing ordinary academic services, funds transfers, or even certain forms of collaboration to a person or institution in a comprehensively embargoed country can itself require an OFAC license, independent of any EAR/ITAR analysis.
The practical consequence: a research project can clear EAR/ITAR review entirely (published, unrestricted fundamental research, no controlled items) and still require OFAC analysis if a collaborating institution, co-investigator, or funding flow touches a comprehensively embargoed country. The two analyses are run separately, not as substitutes for each other.
What comprehensive embargoes mean for university research collaboration
OFAC’s comprehensive sanctions regulations generally prohibit US persons from exporting services to, or engaging in most transactions with, the government or persons of an embargoed country. For a university, “services” can reach further than it might sound — collaborative research assistance, consulting input, certain forms of joint authorship coordination, and administering funds on behalf of a sanctioned-country partner can all fall inside that definition depending on the specific program’s regulations.
Several exemptions and general licenses matter in practice, though their exact scope varies by sanctions program and changes over time, so any specific reliance on one should be confirmed with export-control counsel or an institution’s research-security office before acting on it:
- The informational materials exemption. Rooted in the Berman Amendment to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, most OFAC sanctions programs exempt the export or import of already-published, publicly available “informational materials” — books, films, publications, and comparable content — from the embargo. This is why openly publishing research findings, even where a co-author or reader is located in an embargoed country, is generally treated differently from actively providing collaborative services to that country. The exemption is narrower than it sounds: it does not cover software not yet in the public domain, most fee-based services, or defense-related technical data, and it does not remove the underlying transaction (e.g. paying a collaborator, providing consulting) from OFAC’s reach.
- Program-specific general licenses. OFAC periodically authorizes categories of activity — for example, certain academic and educational exchanges, or specific humanitarian and public-health-related transactions — under a general license for a given country program, without requiring an institution to apply for its own specific license. General licenses are program-specific, conditional, and subject to change; an institution cannot assume one exists or still applies without checking the current regulations for that country program directly.
- Specific licenses. Where no exemption or general license covers the activity, an institution (or, in practice, usually its sponsored-programs or export-control office on its behalf) can apply to OFAC for a specific license authorizing a defined transaction or collaboration. This is a formal application with processing time, and should be planned for well before an agreement or exchange is meant to start, not requested after the fact.
The practical implication for a research-administration office: any prospective institutional partnership, MOU, sub-award, visiting-scholar arrangement, or funds transfer involving a partner institution, government entity, or individual in Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Russian-occupied Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk warrants an OFAC-specific review as a distinct step from EAR/ITAR review and from routine restricted-party screening against the SDN List.
Travel considerations
OFAC’s country-embargo regulations are separate from, and should not be confused with, US State Department travel advisories, which are informational rather than restrictive. Historically, OFAC’s own travel-related restrictions have been most significant for Cuba, where the Cuban Assets Control Regulations have at various times restricted the categories of travel-related transactions US persons — including university faculty, staff, and students — may engage in, requiring travel to fall within an authorized category (such as certain educational or professional-research activity) rather than general tourism. The specific authorized-travel categories for Cuba have changed repeatedly with policy shifts and should be checked directly against OFAC’s current Cuba program regulations before a trip is finalized, not assumed from a prior year’s policy. Travel-related restrictions under the other comprehensive programs are narrower or largely absent by comparison, but institutions should still confirm current guidance for the destination before authorizing university-sponsored travel to any comprehensively embargoed country.
Technology transfer and collaboration-agreement implications
For technology transfer and sponsored-programs offices specifically, comprehensive embargoes add a layer distinct from ordinary EAR/ITAR technology-control planning:
- Licensing and material transfer agreements. A license agreement, material transfer agreement, or data-sharing agreement naming a counterparty located in — or a government instrumentality of — a comprehensively embargoed country needs OFAC review before execution, separately from whatever EAR/ITAR classification applies to the underlying technology.
- Sponsored research and sub-awards. A sub-award or collaboration agreement that would send funds, equipment, or services to an institution in an embargoed country needs the same review, again independent of whether the research itself is fundamental and EAR/ITAR-exempt.
- Nationality is not the same test as location. This is a common point of confusion: EAR/ITAR’s deemed-export rules turn on a foreign national’s citizenship/permanent-residence status, regardless of where they are physically located (a deemed export can occur inside a US lab). OFAC’s comprehensive-country programs, by contrast, generally turn on the location of the transaction or the government/person involved, not the nationality of a researcher who happens to hold citizenship of an embargoed country but is lawfully present and working in the United States. A foreign national researcher who is a national of, say, Iran or Cuba, but is physically in a US lab, is generally not themselves “the embargoed country” for OFAC purposes in the way a deemed export analysis treats their nationality under EAR — though that same researcher’s individual status still needs separate screening against the SDN List and any applicable visa/research-security requirements, and payments or transfers routed through a person or entity actually located in the embargoed country still trigger OFAC review regardless of anyone’s nationality.
Because these distinctions are easy to blur under time pressure — a term-sheet deadline, a visiting-scholar start date — the practical fix is procedural: route any agreement, transfer, or invitation that touches a comprehensively embargoed country through both EAR/ITAR review and a distinct OFAC check, rather than assuming a clean fundamental-research or deemed-export determination also clears the OFAC question.
Practical compliance steps for research-administration offices
- Screen counterparty location and government affiliation, not just controlled-item status. Before finalizing a collaboration agreement, sub-award, MTA, or visiting-scholar invitation, confirm whether any counterparty institution, government entity, or individual is located in a comprehensively embargoed country or territory.
- Run this as a distinct step from restricted-party screening. Restricted-party screening against the OFAC SDN List and other consolidated lists catches specifically designated individuals and entities; it does not by itself catch a transaction that is prohibited simply because of where the counterparty is located under a comprehensive country program.
- Document which exemption or license, if any, an activity relies on. If a project proceeds on the basis of the informational-materials exemption or a general license, record that determination and its basis at the time the decision is made, not reconstructed later during an audit or inquiry.
- Loop in export-control counsel early for anything not clearly exempt. Specific-license applications take real processing time; a start date or transfer deadline set before OFAC review is complete is a self-inflicted compliance risk.
- Re-check before renewal, not just at initiation. Sanctions programs change; a collaboration or license agreement that cleared OFAC review at signing should be re-screened at renewal or amendment, particularly for longer-running institutional partnerships.
Frequently asked questions
Is the OFAC embargoed-countries list the same as the EAR/ITAR country lists?
No. OFAC’s comprehensive-embargo list is short (currently Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Russian-occupied Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk) and restricts transactions with the country broadly. EAR and ITAR instead apply country-specific licensing requirements to controlled items and technical data, and those requirements exist for a much wider set of destinations, including many countries that are not OFAC-embargoed at all. A destination can trigger an EAR/ITAR license requirement without appearing on the OFAC comprehensive list, and vice versa.
Does publishing openly with a co-author in an embargoed country violate OFAC sanctions?
Generally, the informational-materials exemption (rooted in the Berman Amendment) protects the publication and exchange of already-public informational materials, including scholarly publications, from most OFAC country embargoes. It does not automatically extend to every form of collaboration around producing that publication — funds transfers, paid consulting, or ongoing collaborative services can fall outside the exemption even where the eventual publication itself would not. Institutions should not treat “we’re just publishing” as a blanket OFAC clearance for the full collaboration.
If a foreign national researcher in our lab is a citizen of an embargoed country, does that alone create an OFAC problem?
Not by itself. OFAC’s comprehensive country programs are generally location- and transaction-based rather than nationality-based, which is a different test than the nationality-based deemed-export analysis under EAR. A researcher’s citizenship of an embargoed country is still relevant to restricted-party screening and research-security review, but it does not, on its own, make their presence and work in a US lab an OFAC-prohibited transaction the way it would if funds or services were being routed to a person or entity actually located in that country.
Who at a university should review a potential collaboration involving an embargoed country?
Typically the institution’s export-control office (sometimes housed within research compliance, sponsored programs, or a dedicated research-security function) — the same office that handles EAR/ITAR determinations is usually the right first point of contact, since it will run the OFAC analysis alongside, not instead of, the EAR/ITAR one.
