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Editorial · CASRAI · Compliance and regulatory

China’s Spy Agency Ran Campaign to Acquire Advanced AI Chips, NYT Reports

The NYT reports, citing foreign officials, that China’s Ministry of State Security has run a two-year campaign to acquire advanced AI chips.

Published 22 Nov 2026· 7 minute read
Rows of black server racks with network cabling in a data centre room with raised floor
Photo: Carl Lender from Sunrise, USA / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0 (cropped). Source · Licence

China’s Ministry of State Security has run a campaign for at least two years to help Chinese companies acquire advanced AI chips and to gather intelligence on the semiconductor industry, The New York Times reported on 21 November 2026, citing officials from governments outside China. This follows earlier casrai coverage of the Commerce and Justice Department Megaspeed investigation: the new development is that the reporting places the acquisition effort inside China’s intelligence ministry itself. These are allegations attributed to officials, and they bear on export-control compliance and research security at universities.

What happened

The Times reported that when China’s top espionage agency updated its priorities this year, it added a goal of overcoming Western barriers to technologies that President Xi Jinping sees as crucial to China’s rise. At the heart of that effort, the paper said, are the advanced semiconductors needed to power AI, including chips that the United States has barred American companies such as Nvidia from exporting to China.

The account rests on several serving and former security and intelligence officials from governments outside China, in Asia, the United States and Europe, who spoke on condition of anonymity. According to those officials, the campaign has been under way for at least two years, and its details had not been reported before. The same account was relayed on 22 November by Seoul Economic Daily, which attributed it to the Times report of the 21st.

The working team

Multiple foreign officials told the Times that Chen Yixin, the minister of state security, created a working team that leads the effort and reports directly to him. The team was assigned to support China’s “counter-blockade” work, meaning efforts to overcome export controls imposed by the United States and its allies. Officials said the campaign includes helping Chinese companies acquire and smuggle advanced chips into China, and that the group also collects intelligence about the semiconductor sector and its supply chains.

Key details

  • Duration: at least two years, according to the current and former officials.
  • Leadership: a team reporting directly to Chen Yixin, who has worked under Xi since both were officials in Zhejiang Province.
  • Public signals: in April, Chen wrote in a Communist Party journal that the ministry should “deepen the struggle against blockades” and “focus on tackling the ‘chokeholds’ of critical technologies”, solving the problem of technologies that “cannot be obtained by asking, buying or pleading.”
  • Top-level policy: Xi told the Politburo in January that China must “adopt extraordinary measures to intensify the drive for core technologies in priority sectors”, according to an official text of the speech quoted by the Times.
  • Coordination: the Central Science and Technology Commission, a secretive party body Xi established in 2023, is coordinating the wider push. It is led by Politburo Standing Committee member Ding Xuexiang, and its budgets and plans are not public.

Background and context

The US Commerce Department began barring exports of Nvidia’s most advanced chips directly to China in late 2022. Xi set up the Central Science and Technology Commission in 2023, not long afterwards. Chen became state security minister in late 2022, and just over a year later the ministry warned that AI was “highly likely in the near future to profoundly transform the national security landscape”, the Times noted.

The campaign has become, in the Times’ words, a central question in the case of Alice Huang, a Chinese businesswoman whom US officials say the ministry was working with to spy on Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang. Her Singapore-based company, Megaspeed, bought billions of dollars of Nvidia chips and entered the business of providing high-end computing capacity to Chinese companies; such services let Chinese businesses use Nvidia chips at data centres abroad while sidestepping US rules on direct sales. The Times reported that the US government is investigating Megaspeed for illegally smuggling advanced chips into China, and that the precise nature of Alice Huang’s role in the ministry’s chip effort remains unclear. Earlier casrai posts cover the Megaspeed internal investigation and Alice Huang’s departure, the report that Nvidia introduced Alibaba to Alice Huang, and House Foreign Affairs Committee licence data on AI chips and China.

Reaction

Alex Joske, managing director of the security practice at the consultancy Garnaut Global, told the Times that Chen “is signalling to the party leadership and his own ranks that his agency is elevating AI competition with the US as a long-term, top priority” and “is telling his officers to find more ways to wage this struggle.” Joske also said the ministry is “very comfortable using business covers” and “running people as assets without directly telling those people that they’re working for the M.S.S.”

China has rejected the espionage claims linked to Alice Huang as “pure fabrication”, the Times reported. An Alibaba spokeswoman, responding to a separate Times report about Megaspeed and a lab with links to China’s military, said: “Any suggestions that Alibaba provides services to the military is groundless.”

The US rule on overseas data centres

The report landed days after Washington moved against the remote-access route. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security released an interim final rule, “Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors”, on 16 November 2026, with Federal Register publication scheduled for 19 November. According to its abstract, the rule requires licences for exports, reexports or in-country transfers to overseas data centres that remotely supply significant volumes of compute to companies headquartered in Country Group D:5 or Macau, and it requires data centres, foreign foundries and chip exporters to perform due diligence on customers, including direct or indirect ownership or control by persons in those places. A licence will also be required to export advanced semiconductors to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil.

Element What the rule provides, per law-firm analysis
Trigger More than 12,000,000 aggregate total processing performance (TPP), at one data centre or across linked data centres
Existing arrangements A data centre already supplying covered companies must obtain a licence within 90 days of the effective date
Due diligence Exporters are expected to obtain know-your-customer information from the data centre; a refusal is a presumptive red flag
Exclusion Access provided only for a commercial recommender system, subject to a submission to BIS
Comments Due 60 days after publication

The table follows the Gibson Dunn client alert on the rule. The Times described the same restriction as requiring overseas data centres to obtain a government licence before supplying “significant volumes of computing power” to firms headquartered in listed countries including China, Russia and Iran, taking effect in about 90 days.

What it means for researchers, universities and research offices

The reporting is about a state agency and commercial brokers, not about universities, but it sharpens three existing compliance questions. These points are editorial interpretation rather than findings in the sources.

  • Compute procurement and cloud access. The rule’s due-diligence logic, which asks who ultimately owns or controls a data centre or customer, is the same question a research office faces when a lab rents GPU capacity abroad or accepts compute from a third-party provider. Offices that rely on overseas providers may wish to review ownership and customer-screening information on file, and to check the rule text itself for how it applies.
  • Export-controlled research and deemed exports. Where a project involves controlled technology, existing deemed export and export-controlled research procedures remain the baseline for who may access equipment, code and data.
  • Foreign-influence screening. Joske’s point that the ministry uses business covers, and the Times’ reference to a September MI5 assertion that a Chinese research institute linked to the ministry drew in British scientists whose work, apparently unknown to them, “directly improves M.S.S. technical capability for espionage”, reinforce the case for undue foreign influence review of collaborations and visiting arrangements as part of a wider research security programme.

Research security officers may also find the framing useful in training: the reported campaign treats chip access, supply-chain knowledge and academic-style covers as parts of one effort.

What happens next

The BIS rule took effect on Federal Register publication, scheduled for 19 November 2026, and comments are due 60 days after publication, which Gibson Dunn calculates as about 18 January 2027 if publication occurred on 19 November. Data centres already serving covered companies have 90 days from the effective date to obtain licences. The Times reported that the US government continues to investigate Megaspeed; any enforcement outcomes would come through those processes.

Sources

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